__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Sun Solaris Buffer Overflow in lpq(1B) Command
[Sun(sm) Alert Notification 52443]
April 1, 2003 20:00 GMT Number N-068
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A buffer overflow exists in the lpq(1B) command.
PLATFORM: * Solaris 2.6
* Solaris 7
DAMAGE: By carefully crafting overflow data, a local attacker could run
arbitrary code with root privilege.
SOLUTION: Apply workaround or patches as stated in Sun's Alert
Notification.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. An attacker would need a legitimate account
ASSESSMENT: on the target machine to upgrade the privileges as described.
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LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-068.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN:
http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/
retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F52443&zone_32=category%3Asecurity
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start Sun(sm) Alert Notification 52443 *****]
Sun(sm) Alert Notification
Sun Alert ID: 52443
Synopsis: Solaris Security Vulnerability due to a Buffer Overflow in lpq(1B)
Category: Security
Product: Solaris
BugIDs: 4236546
Avoidance: Patch
State: Resolved
Date Released: 31-Mar-2003
Date Closed: 31-Mar-2003
Date Modified: 31-Mar-2003
1. Impact
Local unprivileged users may be able to gain unauthorized root access due to
a buffer overflow in the lpq(1B) command.
This issue is described in NSFOCUS Security Bulletin SA2003-02 available from
http://www.nsfocus.com/english/homepage/sa2003-02.htm.
Sun acknowledges with thanks, NSFOCUS Information Technology, for bringing this
issue to our attention.
2. Contributing Factors
This issue can occur in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
Solaris 2.6 without patch 106235-12
Solaris 7 without patch 107115-12
x86 Platform
Solaris 2.6 without patch 106236-12
Solaris 7 without patch 107116-12
Note: Solaris 2.5.1 will not be evaluated regarding the potential impact of the
issue described in this Sun Alert document.
Solaris 8 and Solaris 9 are not impacted by this issue.
3. Symptoms
There are no symptoms that would show the buffer overflow in lpq(1B) has been
exploited to gain unauthorized root access to a host. Failed attempts to
exploit lpq(1B) might result in a core file being generated. If file(1) was run
on this core, it would show that it was produced from lpq(1B).
Solution Summary Top
4. Relief/Workaround
To work around the described issue, remove the set-user-ID bit from lpstat(1).
The lpq(1B) command is a symbolic link to lpstat(1) . This can be done with the
following command as the root user:
# /usr/bin/chmod u-s /usr/bin/lpstat
Note: Removing the set-user-ID bit from the lpstat(1) binary will prevent
unprivileged users from displaying information about the print service.
5. Resolution
This issue is addressed in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
Solaris 2.6 with patch 106235-12 or later
Solaris 7 with patch 107115-12 or later
x86 Platform
Solaris 2.6 with patch 106236-12 or later
Solaris 7 with patch 107116-12 or later
This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis.
This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties.
The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact
your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to
the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING
THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun
Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information.
It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to
purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement,
the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for
the purposes contemplated by these agreements.
Copyright 2000-2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle,
Santa Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved.
[***** End Sun(sm) Alert Notification 52443 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
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among computer security teams worldwide.
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