TUCoPS :: SunOS/Solaris

TUCoPS :: SunOS/Solaris :: n-124.txt
Sun Solaris 8 LDAP Clear Text Password Vulnerability (CIAC N-124)

__________________________________________________________

The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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/ | /_\ /
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INFORMATION BULLETIN

Sun Solaris 8 LDAP Clients May Log the Proxy Agent User's Password as Clear Text
[Sun Alert ID: 55380]

July 22, 2003 19:00 GMT Number N-124
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Local unprivileged users may be able to gain access to the
password of the privileged proxy agent on Solaris 8 systems
configured as LDAP (see ldap(1)) clients.
PLATFORM: Solaris 8
DAMAGE: The password of the privileged proxy agent user may be sent to
the syslog daemon (syslogd(1M)) and logged in clear text.
SOLUTION: Apply patch or workaround as stated in Sun's Alert.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
ASSESSMENT: (LDAP) is widely implemented in systems. A local user account
is required to exploit this vulnerability.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-124.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN:
http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/
retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F55380&zone_32=category%3Asecurity
______________________________________________________________________________

[***** Start Sun Alert ID: 55380 *****]

Sun(sm) Alert Notification
Sun Alert ID: 55380
Synopsis: Solaris 8 LDAP Clients May Log the Proxy Agent User's Password as
Clear Text
Category: Security
Product: Solaris
BugIDs: 4861279
Avoidance: Patch
State: Resolved
Date Released: 18-Jul-2003
Date Closed: 18-Jul-2003
Date Modified:

1. Impact

Local unprivileged users may be able to gain access to the password of the
privileged proxy agent on Solaris 8 systems configured as LDAP (see ldap(1))
clients.

2. Contributing Factors

This issue can occur in the following releases:

SPARC Platform

* Solaris 8 with patch 108993-18 through 108993-20 and without patch
108993-21 or later

x86 Platform

* Solaris 8 with patch 108994-18 through 108994-20 and without patch
108994-21 or later

This issue may only occur with Solaris 8 systems configured as LDAP clients.

To check if the system is configured as an LDAP client, use the following
command:

$ ldapclient -l
NS_LDAP_FILE_VERSION= 1.0
NS_LDAP_BINDDN= cn=proxyagent,ou=profile,dc=blr03-01,dc=india,dc=sun,dc=com
NS_LDAP_BINDPASSWD= {NS1}3d1a48e906c04161baa4
NS_LDAP_SERVERS= 1XX.1XX.233.128
NS_LDAP_SEARCH_BASEDN= dc=blr03-01,dc=india,dc=Sun,dc=COM
NS_LDAP_AUTH= NS_LDAP_AUTH_SIMPLE
NS_LDAP_SEARCH_REF= NS_LDAP_FOLLOWREF
NS_LDAP_SEARCH_SCOPE= NS_LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL
NS_LDAP_SEARCH_TIME= 30
NS_LDAP_PROFILE= s8prof1

Notes:

* Solaris 2.6, 7 and 9 are not affected
* Patch 108994-21 was not issued for standard distribution

3. Symptoms

The password of the privileged proxy agent user may be sent to the syslog
daemon (syslogd(1M)) and logged in clear text.

Solution Summary

4. Relief/Workaround

To work around the described issue, edit the "/etc/syslog.conf" file and remove
the string "*.err" to prevent the proxy agent user's password from being logged.

Change:

*.err;kern.debug;mail.crit /var/adm/messages
to

kern.debug;mail.crit /var/adm/messages

Note: Removing the "*.err;" level from the "/etc/syslog.conf" file will result
in certain error messages not getting logged. See the syslog.conf(4) man page
for more details.

5. Resolution

This issue is addressed in the following releases:

SPARC Platform

* Solaris 8 with patch 108993-21 or later

x86 Platform

* Solaris 8 with patch 108994-21 or later

This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This
Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The
issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your
system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the
information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING
THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This
Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information.
It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to
purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement, the
Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for the
purposes contemplated by these agreements.

[***** End Sun Alert ID: 55380 *****]

_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
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