TUCoPS :: SunOS/Solaris :: o-011.txt

Sun Vulnerability in Solaris AnswerBook2 documentation admin script (CIAC O-011)


             __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                   Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
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                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

     Sun Vulnerability in Solaris "AnswerBook2 Documentation" Admin Script
                             [Sun Alert ID: 57400]

October 20, 2003 17:00 GMT                                        Number O-011
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       A malicious user can access the administration of the 
               AnswerBook2. 
               Note--The AnswerBook2 Documentation Server gives 
               customers the ability to view Sun documentation using their 
               favoriate browser. 
SOFTWARE:      AnswerBook2 Documentation Server Version 1.4.4 or earlier 
DAMAGE:        An unprivileged local or remote users may be able to execute 
               AnswerBook2 (AB2) administrative commands, such as creating new 
               AB2 adminstrator accounts on systems configured as AnswerBook2 
               servers. 
SOLUTION:      Upgrade to appropriate patch. 
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  The risk is LOW. A malicious user can access the administration 
ASSESSMENT:    and create new accounts. 
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS: 
 CIAC BULLETIN:      http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/o-011.shtml 
 ORIGINAL BULLETIN:  Sun Alert ID: 57400                                           
                     http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert
                     %2F57400&zone_32=category%3Asecurity 

______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start Sun Alert ID: 57400 *****]

Sun(sm) Alert Notification 
Sun Alert ID: 57400 
Synopsis: Vulnerability in Solaris "AnswerBook2 Documentation Server" Admin Script 
Category: Security 
Product: AnswerBook2 Documentation Server 
BugIDs: 4859614 
Avoidance: Workaround 
State: Resolved 
Date Released: 16-Oct-2003 
Date Closed: 16-Oct-2003 
Date Modified: 

1. Impact 

Unprivileged local or remote users may be able to execute AnswerBook2 (AB2) 
administrative commands, such as creating new AB2 administrator accounts on systems 
configured as AnswerBook2 servers. 

This issue is one of two vulnerabilities discussed in S21sec advisory s21sec-004 at: 
http://www.s21sec.com/en/avisos/s21sec-004-en.txt 

The other vulnerability discussed in the S21sec advisory is described in Sun Alert 
23412. 

2. Contributing Factors 

This issue can occur in the following releases: 

SPARC Platform 

* AnswerBook2 Documentation Server versions 1.4.4 or earlier 

x86 Platform 

* AnswerBook2 Documentation Server versions 1.4.4 or earlier 

Note: AnswerBook2 is no longer supported as of Solaris 9, and thus Solaris 9 is not 
affected. 

To determine the version of the currently installed AnswerBook2 Server, run the 
following command: 

    $ grep SUNW_PRODVERS /var/sadm/pkg/SUNWab2[rsu]/pkginfo
    /var/sadm/pkg/SUNWab2r/pkginfo:SUNW_PRODVERS=1.4.4
    /var/sadm/pkg/SUNWab2s/pkginfo:SUNW_PRODVERS=1.4.4
    /var/sadm/pkg/SUNWab2u/pkginfo:SUNW_PRODVERS=1.4.4                                    

3. Symptoms 

The appearance of suspicious (unknown) AnswerBook2 administrator accounts in the file 
"/usr/lib/ab2/dweb/data/config/admin_passwd" may indicate that the described issue has 
been exploited to add additional AB2 administrator accounts. Each line in this file 
starts with the name of an AnswerBook2 administrator account. For example, the lines: 

    ab2admin:AA7Zghd5fFgfF
    peter:AA65RfgdtzHggdh
    mary:AAFgdt569Uhgf                                    

indicate that there are currently three AnswerBook2 administrator accounts named 
"ab2admin", "peter" and "mary". 

There are no predictable symptoms that would show the described issue has been 
exploited to execute other AnswerBook2 (AB2) administrative commands on a system. 

Solution Summary Top 

4. Relief/Workaround 

To prevent the unauthorized addition of AB2 administrators, change the permissions of 
the AB2 "password" file as the root user: 

    # chmod a-w /usr/lib/ab2/dweb/data/config/admin_passwd                                    

This will prevent additional AB2 administrators from being added. 

If additional admins are required, one can add write access to the file temporarily, 
add the admin, remove write access once again - then check the file to make sure the 
listed admins are correct. 

Sites which have configured AnswerBook2 Documentation Servers may wish to disable AB2 
and instead refer to Sun documentation at the Sun Product Documentation web site: 
http://docs.sun.com or view the documentation on the Solaris Documentation CD. 

To disable the AnswerBook2 Documentation Server, the following commands can be run as 
the root user: 

    # /usr/lib/ab2/bin/ab2admin -o stop
    # /usr/lib/ab2/bin/ab2admin -o autostart_no                                    

5. Resolution 

Please see the "Relief/Workaround" section for the resolution to this issue. 

This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert 
notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in 
this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no 
representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY 
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY 
DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE 
LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT 
ARISE OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun Alert 
notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information. It is being provided 
to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if 
you do not have such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification 
may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these agreements. 

Copyright 2000-2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054 
U.S.A. All rights reserved. 

[***** End Sun Alert ID: 57400 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the 
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
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