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CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.26
Original issue date: December 18, 1996
Last revised: January 20, 1997
Appendix A - added information from Data General Corporation.
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Topic: Denial-of-Service Attack via ping
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The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a denial-of-service
attack using large ICMP datagrams. Exploitation details involving this
vulnerability have been widely distributed.
The CERT/CC team recommends installing vendor patches as they become
available.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please
check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.
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I. Description
The TCP/IP specification (the basis for many protocols used on the
Internet) allows for a maximum packet size of up to 65536 octets (1 octet
= 8 bits of data), containing a minimum of 20 octets of IP header
information and 0 or more octets of optional information, with the rest
of the packet being data. It is known that some systems will react in an
unpredictable fashion when receiving oversized IP packets. Reports
indicate a range of reactions including crashing, freezing, and
rebooting.
In particular, the reports received by the CERT Coordination Center
indicate that Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets issued via
the "ping" command have been used to trigger this behavior. ICMP is a
subset of the TCP/IP suite of protocols that transmits error and control
messages between systems. Two specific instances of the ICMP are the ICMP
ECHO_REQUEST and ICMP ECHO_RESPONSE datagrams. These two instances can be
used by a local host to determine whether a remote system is reachable
via the network; this is commonly achieved using the "ping" command.
Discussion in public forums has centered around the use of the "ping"
command to construct oversized ICMP datagrams (which are encapsulated
within an IP packet). Many ping implementations by default send ICMP
datagrams consisting only of the 8 octets of ICMP header information but
allow the user to specify a larger packet size if desired.
You can read more information about this vulnerability on Mike
Bremford's Web page. (Note that this is not a CERT/CC maintained
page. We provide the URL here for your convenience.)
http://www.sophist.demon.co.uk/ping/index.html
II. Impact
Systems receiving oversized ICMP datagrams may crash, freeze, or
reboot, resulting in denial of service.
III. Solution
First, since crashing a router or firewall may be part of a larger,
multistage attack scenario, we encourage you to inspect the running
configuration of any such systems that have crashed to ensure that the
configuration information is what you expect it to be.
Then install a patch from your vendor.
Below is a list of vendors who have provided information about
patches for this problem. Details are in Appendix A of this
advisory; we will update the appendix as we receive more
information. If your vendor's name is not on this list, please
contact the vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
Computer Associates, Intl. (products for NCR)
Cray Research
Digital Equipment Corporation
Free BSD, Inc.
Hewlett-Packard Company
IBM Corporation
Linux Systems
NEC Corporation
Open Software Foundation (OSF)
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
...........................................................................
Appendix A - Vendor Information
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, please contact the vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
=====================================
BSD/OS 2.1 is not vulnerable to this problem. It correctly handles
large packets without any problems.
Computer Associates, Intl.
==========================
(products for NCR)
Not vulnerable.
Cray Research
=============
Attempts to send oversized ICMP datagrams are rejected with
appropriate error messages. We believe that oversized ICMP datagrams
sent to Unicos systems will also be rejected without crashing.
Data General Corporation
========================
Due to the way DG/UX processes tcp packets, DG/UX is not vulnerable to
this attack.
Digital Equipment Corporation
=============================
MSG ID: SSRT0429 From DSNlink/DIA Database
The following is important information concerning a potential denial of
service issue which affects Digital UNIX Operating System, Digital UNIX
MLS+, Firewall implementations, and Digital TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS AXP &
VAX
COMPONENT: System Security / Potential Denial of Service
DIGITAL UNIX Version: 3.0, 3.0b, 3.2, 3.2c, 3.2de1, 3.2de2,
3.2f, 3.2g, 4.0, 4.0a
DIGITAL UNIX MLS+ Version 3.1a
DIGITAL TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS AXP & VAX Versions - 4.0, 4.1
DIGITAL ULTRIX Versions 4.3, 4.3a, 4.4, 4.5
DIGITAL Firewall for UNIX
DIGITAL AltaVista Firewall for UNIX
DIGITAL VAX/ELN
For more information check the DSNlink/DIA Articles (keyword PING), or the
URL http://www.service.digital.com/html/whats-new.html for the latest
information.
ADVISORY INFORMATION:
Digital recently discovered a potential denial of service issue that
may occur by remote systems exploiting a recently published problem while
executing the 'ping' command. Solutions and initial communications
began appearing in DSNlink/DIA FLASH/articles in late October, 1996.
SEVERITY LEVEL: High.
SOLUTION:
Digital has reacted promptly to this reported problem and a complete
set of patch kits are being prepared for all currently supported
platforms.
The Digital patches may be obtained from your local Digital support
channel or from the URL listed above. Please refer to the applicable README
notes information prior to the installation of patch kits on your system.
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
Copyright (c) Digital Equipment Corporation, 1996, All Rights Reserved.
Unpublished Rights Reserved Under The Copyright Laws Of The United States.
Free BSD, Inc.
==============
We have fixed the problem in 2.1.6 and -current.
Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
For HP9000 Series 700 and 800 systems, apply the appropriate patch.
See Hewlett-Packard Security Bulletin #000040 (HPSBUX9610-040) for further
details. The bulletin is available from the HP SupportLine and
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/vendors/hp/
Patch Name(Platform/OS) | Notes
--------------------------+----------------------------------
PHNE_9027 (s700 9.01) : PHNE_7704 must first be installed
PHNE_9028 (s700 9.03/5/7) : PHNE_7252 must first be installed
PHNE_9030 (s700 10.00) : No patch dependencies
PHNE_9032 (s700 10.01) : PHNE_8168 must first be installed
PHNE_9034 (s700 10.10) : PHNE_8063 must first be installed
PHNE_9036 (s700 10.20) : No patch dependencies
--------------------------+----------------------------------
PHNE_8672 (s800 9.00) : PHNE_7197 must first be installed
PHNE_9029 (s800 9.04) : PHNE_7317 must first be installed
PHNE_9031 (s800 10.00) : No patch dependencies
PHNE_9033 (s800 10.01) : PHNE_8169 must first be installed
PHNE_9035 (s800 10.10) : PHNE_8064 must first be installed
PHNE_9037 (s800 10.20) : No patch dependencies
--------------------------+----------------------------------
For our MPE operating system, patches are in process. Watch for the issuance
of our MPE security bulletin.
IBM Corporation
===============
See the appropriate release below to determine your action.
AIX 3.2
-------
Apply the following fix to your system:
APAR - IX59644 (PTF - U444227 U444232)
To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following
command:
lslpp -lB U444227 U444232
AIX 4.1
-------
Apply the following fix to your system:
APAR - IX59453
To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX59453
Or run the following command:
lslpp -h bos.net.tcp.client
Your version of bos.net.tcp.client should be 4.1.4.16 or later.
AIX 4.2
-------
Apply the following fix to your system:
APAR - IX61858
To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX61858
Or run the following command:
lslpp -h bos.net.tcp.client
Your version of bos.net.tcp.client should be 4.2.0.6 or later.
IBM SNG Firewall
----------------
NOTE: The fixes in this section should ONLY be applied to systems
running the IBM Internet Connection Secured Network Gateway (SNG)
firewall software. They should be applied IN ADDITION TO the IBM
AIX fixes listed in the previous section.
IBM SNG V2.1
------------
APAR - IR33376 PTF UR46673
IBM SNG V2.2
------------
APAR - IR33484 PTF UR46641
To Order
--------
APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist)
or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist,
reference URL:
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist".
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation.
Linux Systems
=============
We recommend that you upgrade your Linux 1.3.x and 2.0.x kernels to Linux
2.0.27. This is available from all the main archive sites such as
ftp://ftp.cs.helsinki.fi/pub/Software/Linux
Users wishing to remain with an earlier kernel version may download a
patch from http://www.uk.linux.org/big-ping-patch. This patch will work with
2.0.x kernel revisions but is untested with 1.3.x kernel revisions.
Red Hat Linux has chosen to issue a 2.0.18 based release with the fix. Red
Hat users should obtain this from
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/redhat-4.0/updates/i386/kernel-2.0.18-6.i386.rpm
NEC Corporation
===============
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OS Version Status
- ------------------ ------------ -------------------------------------
EWS-UX/V(Rel4.0) R1.x - R6.x not vulnerable
EWS-UX/V(Rel4.2) R7.x - R10.x not vulnerable
EWS-UX/V(Rel4.2MP) R10.x not vulnerable
UP-UX/V R1.x - R4.x not vulnerable
UP-UX/V(Rel4.2MP) R5.x - R7.x not vulnerable
UX/4800 R11.x not vulnerable
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NCR
====
see Computer Associates, Intl.
Open Software Foundation (OSF)
==============================
OSF's OSF/1 R1.3.3 maintenance release includes a solution for this
problem.
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
===================================
The following SCO products are known to be vulnerable:
SCO OpenServer 5.0.0, 5.0.2
SCO Internet FastStart 1.0.0, 1.1.0
SCO Open Desktop 3.0
SCO TCP/IP 1.2.1 on SCO Unix System V/386 Release 3.2 Version 4.2
The symptoms encountered vary greatly and seem to be related to the type
of network interface device being used. Support Level Supplement (SLS)
OSS449 addresses this problem for the following releases:
SCO OpenServer 5.0.0, 5.0.2
SCO Internet FastStart 1.0.0, 1.1.0.
This Supplement is available at the following URLs:
ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SLS/oss449a.ltr (cover letter)
ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SLS/oss449a.Z (image)
The checksums are as follows:
sum -r
------
oss449a.ltr: 28877 42
oss449a.Z: 54558 1762
MD5
---
MD5 (oss449a.Z) = e8fc8a29dd59683ce5107f3b9b8d1169
MD5 (oss449a.ltr) = d51ee1caf33edb86f4dbeb1733c99d86
If this SLS is ever updated, it will be noted at:
ftp://ftp.sco.COM/SLS/README
Should more information become available for either SCO's OpenServer or
UnixWare products, SCO will provide updated information for this advisory.
If you need further assistance, SCO's Web page is at http://www.sco.COM.
Support requests from supported customers may be addressed to
support@sco.COM, or you may contact SCO as follows:
USA/Canada: 6am-5pm Pacific Standard Time (PST)
-----------
1-408-425-4726 (voice)
1-408-427-5443 (fax)
Pacific Rim, Asia, and Latin American customers: 6am-5pm Pacific
------------------------------------------------ Standard Time
(PST)
1-408-425-4726 (voice)
1-408-427-5443 (fax)
Europe, Middle East, Africa: 9am-5:00pm Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
----------------------------
+44 1923 816344 (voice)
+44 1923 817781 (fax)
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
We are looking into this problem.
...........................................................................
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The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks AUSCERT, the Australian Computer
Emergency Response Team, and DFN-CERT, the German team, for their
contributions to this advisory, and we thank Mike Bremford for permission to
cite the information he has made available to the community.
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If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (see ftp://info.cert.org/pub/FIRST/first-contacts).
CERT/CC Contact Information
- ----------------------------
Email cert@cert.org
Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
Fax +1 412-268-6989
Postal address
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
USA
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can
support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
Location of CERT PGP key
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
http://www.cert.org/
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/
CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
comp.security.announce
To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send your
email address to
cert-advisory-request@cert.org
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Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University
This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided
it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is
included.
CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
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This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.26.ping
http://www.cert.org
click on "CERT Advisories"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Revision history
Jan. 20, 1997 Appendix A - added information from Data General Corporation.
Jan. 14, 1997 Appendix A - modified SCO entry to include updated patch
information.
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