__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Sendmail SIGHUP-smtpd Vulnerability
November 22, 1996 17:00 GMT Number H-07
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Due to a coding error, a combination of user-level commands and
use of the HUP signal, a user can force sendmail to execute an
arbitary program with root privileges.
PLATFORM: Sendmail versions 8.7 through 8.8.2
DAMAGE: A user can obtain root privileges.
SOLUTION: Install the latest version of sendmail (8.8.3), or the patches
from your vendor for your operating system (as listed below).
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Because of this vulnerability and several others in these and
ASSESSMENT: earlier versions of sendmail, it is highly recommended that you
install the latest patches from your vendor or Sendmail version
8.8.3 as soon as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Based on AUSCERT AA-96.10, CERT CA-96.24, and SGI#19961103-01-I ]
[ CIAC NOTE: Additional information on Silicon Graphics workstations precedes]
[ the original CERT Bulletin ]
[ Info from SGI Bulletin 19961103-01-I ]
| Silicon Graphics:
| ==============================
| Silicon Graphics has historically provided a version 8.6.x sendmail
| program. The most recent SGI sendmail patch (1502) provides a version
| 8.6.12 sendmail program also.
|
| The versions of sendmail provided in the distributed Silicon Graphics IRIX
| operating system versions 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 (and in
| SGI patch 1502, which is the latest released patch for sendmail) are not
| vulnerable to the exploitation as described in the CERT Advisory CA-96:24.
|
| No further action is required.
[ End SGI Bulletin Excerpt 19961103-01-I ]
[ Begin CERT Advisory 96.24]
=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.24
Original issue date: November 21, 1996
Last revised: --
Topic: Sendmail Daemon Mode Vulnerability
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a serious security
problem in sendmail that affects versions 8.7 through 8.8.2. By exploiting
this vulnerability, any local user can gain root access. Exploitation details
involving this vulnerability have been widely distributed.
Independent of this new vulnerability, there are other security problems
with older sendmail versions. Even if you are not running a version between
8.7 and 8.8.2, we strongly encourage you to upgrade to the current version
of sendmail (8.8.3). See Section IV for details.
The CERT/CC team recommends installing vendor patches or upgrading to the
current version of sendmail (8.8.3). Until you can do so, we urge you to
apply the workaround provided in Section III.C. In all cases, be sure to
take the extra precautions listed in Section III.D.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please
check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. In
addition, you can check ftp://info.cert.org/pub/latest_sw_versions/sendmail
to identify the most current version of sendmail.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Description
Sendmail is often run in daemon mode so that it can "listen" for
incoming mail connections on the standard SMTP networking port, usually
port 25. The root user is the only user allowed to start sendmail this
way, and sendmail contains code intended to enforce this restriction.
Unfortunately, due to a coding error, sendmail can be invoked in daemon
mode in a way that bypasses the built-in check. When the check is
bypassed, any local user is able to start sendmail in daemon mode. In
addition, as of version 8.7, sendmail will restart itself when it
receives a SIGHUP signal. It does this restarting operation by
re-executing itself using the exec(2) system call. Re-executing is done
as the root user. By manipulating the sendmail environment, the user can
then have sendmail execute an arbitrary program with root privileges.
II. Impact
Local users can gain root privileges on the local machine.
III. Solution
Install a patch from your vendor if one is available (Section A) or
upgrade to the current version of sendmail (Section B). Until you can
take one of those actions, we recommend applying the workaround described
in Section C. In all cases, you should take the precautions described in
Section D.
A. Install a vendor patch.
Below is a list of vendors who have provided information about
sendmail. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update
the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name is
not on this list, please contact the vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
Data General Corporation
Digital Equipment Corporation
FreeBSD
Hewlett-Packard Company
IBM Corporation
Linux
NeXT Software, Inc.
Open Software Foundation (OSF)
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
B. Upgrade to the current version of sendmail.
Install sendmail 8.8.3. This version is a "drop in" replacement for
8.8.x. There is no patch for any version of sendmail before 8.8.0.
If you are running such a version, strongly consider moving to
version 8.8.3.
Sendmail 8.8.3 is available from
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/ucb/src/sendmail/sendmail.8.8.3.tar.gz
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/sendmail.8.8.3.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/sendmail.8.8.3.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/*
MD5 (sendmail.8.8.3.tar.gz) = 0cb58caae93a19ac69ddd40660e01646
Also in that directory are .Z and .sig files. The .Z file contains
the same bits as the .gz file, but is compressed using UNIX compress
instead of gzip. The .sig is Eric Allman's PGP signature for the
uncompressed tar file. The key fingerprint is
Type bits/keyID Date User ID
pub 1024/BF7BA421 1995/02/23 Eric P. Allman <eric@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
Key fingerprint = C0 28 E6 7B 13 5B 29 02 6F 7E 43 3A 48 4F 45 29
Eric P. Allman <eric@Reference.COM>
Eric P. Allman <eric@Usenix.ORG>
Eric P. Allman <eric@Sendmail.ORG>
Eric P. Allman <eric@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
When you change to a new version of sendmail, we strongly recommend
also changing to the configuration files that are provided with that
version. Significant work has been done to make this task easier.
(In fact, it is highly likely that older configuration files will
not work correctly with sendmail version 8.) It is now possible to
build a sendmail configuration file (sendmail.cf) using the
configuration files provided with the sendmail release. Consult the
cf/README file for a more complete explanation. Creating your
configuration files using this method makes it easier to incorporate
future changes to sendmail into your configuration files.
Sun sendmail users: A paper is available to help you convert your
sendmail configuration files from the Sun version of sendmail to one
that works with sendmail version 8.8.x. The paper is entitled
"Converting Standard Sun Config Files to Sendmail Version 8" and was
written by Rick McCarty of Texas Instruments Inc. It is included in
the distribution and is located in contrib/converting.sun.configs.
C. Apply a workaround.
Eric Allman, the author of sendmail, has provided the following
workaround.
This vulnerability relies on a coding error that has existed in
sendmail since November 1982, allowing non-root users to start up an
SMTP daemon by invoking sendmail as smtpd. However, that error did
not have the current negative implications until sendmail added the
ability to re-execute when a SIGHUP signal was received; this was
added in 8.7.
The anti-smtpd program given in Appendix B refuses to permit sendmail
to be invoked as smtpd by a non-root user. It should be installed
setuid root in place of sendmail (e.g., as /usr/sbin/sendmail or
/usr/lib/sendmail, depending on your system); the real sendmail
should be moved to another place. That location should be set in the
REAL_SENDMAIL definition, and it should not be accessible by ordinary
users. This permits the anti-smtpd program to moderate access to
sendmail.
D. Take additional precautions
Regardless of which solution you apply, you should take these extra
precautions to protect your systems. These precautions do not address
the vulnerabilities described herein, but are recommended as good
practices to follow for the safer operation of sendmail.
* Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)
With *all* versions of sendmail, use the sendmail restricted shell
program (smrsh). You should do this whether you use vendor-supplied
sendmail or install sendmail yourself. Using smrsh gives you
improved administrative control over the programs sendmail executes
on behalf of users.
A number of sites have reported some confusion about the need to
continue using the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh) when
they install a vendor patch or upgrade to a new version of
sendmail. You should always use the smrsh program.
smrsh is included in the sendmail distribution in the subdirectory
smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file for a description of how to
integrate smrsh into your sendmail configuration file.
smrsh is also distributed with some operating systems.
* Use mail.local
If you run /bin/mail based on BSD 4.3 UNIX, replace /bin/mail with
mail.local, which is included in the sendmail distribution. As of
Solaris 2.5 and beyond, mail.local is included with the standard
distribution. It is also included with some other operating systems
distributions, such as FreeBSD.
Although the current version of mail.local is not a perfect
solution, it is important to use it because it addresses
vulnerabilities that are being exploited. For more details, see
CERT advisory CA-95:02.
To use mail.local, replace all references to /bin/mail with
/usr/lib/mail.local. If you are using the M4(1)-based configuration
scheme provided with sendmail 8.X, add the following to your
configuration file:
define(`LOCAL_MAILER_PATH', /usr/lib/mail.local)
* WARNING: Check for setuid executable copies of old versions of
mail programs
If you leave setuid executable copies of older versions of
sendmail installed in /usr/lib (on some systems, it may be
installed elsewhere), the vulnerabilities in those versions could
be exploited if an intruder gains access to your system. This
applies to sendmail.mx as well as other sendmail programs. Either
delete these versions or change the protections on them to be
non-executable.
Similarly, if you replace /bin/mail with mail.local, remember to
remove old copies of /bin/mail or make them non-executable.
IV. Additional Notes
Two other sendmail vulnerabilities are described in CERT advisory
CA-96.20; see that advisory for details.
Since the release of CA-96.20, two additional sendmail vulnerabilities
have been discovered and fixed. By upgrading to sendmail version 8.8.3,
the two problems, noted below, are also fixed. Note that the wrapper
described in Section III.C does not address these vulnerabilities. The
best advice is to upgrade to sendmail version 8.8.3.
A. A vulnerability in sendmail Versions 8.8.0 and 8.8.1 has been
discovered that allows remote users to execute arbitrary commands
with root privileges. This vulnerability exploits exploiting a
problem related to a buffer overflow when converting between 7-bit
and 8-bit MIME messages. Versions prior to Version 8.8.0 do not
contain this vulnerability. Versions before 8.7.6 contain other
unrelated vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is fixed in version
8.8.2 and beyond. The Australian Emergency Response Team (AUSCERT)
issued an advisory on this vulnerability, AA-96.06a, available from
http://www.auscert.org.au/
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/
B. A problem in sendmail has been reported that permits users on a
system to redirect any email in the queue addressed to an unqualified
domain name to a host of their choosing; that is, they can steal queued
email. In some versions of the resolver, they may also be able to
steal queued email addressed to fully qualified addresses. This bug
is believed to exist in all versions of sendmail up to and including
8.8.0. It is fixed in version 8.8.1 and beyond.
Appendix A - Vendor Information
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, please contact the vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
====================================
BSD/OS is vulnerable to the sendmail daemon problem and we have issued an
official patch (U210-029) which may be obtained from our mail-back patches
server at patches@BSDI.COM or via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/patches-2.1/U210-029
Data General Corporation
========================
The sendmail included with Data General's DG/UX is not subject to this
vulnerability.
Digital Equipment Corporation
=============================
DIGITAL Engineering is aware of these reported problems and testing is
currently underway to determine the impact against all currently supported
releases of DIGITAL UNIX and ULTRIX. Patches will be developed (as
necessary) and made available via your normal DIGITAL Support
channel. Notice will be through normal AES services and DIGITAL'S Web site
http://www.service.digital.com/html/whats-new.html
FreeBSD
=======
All currently shipping releases of FreeBSD are affected, including the just
released 2.1.6. An update for 2.1.6 will be available shortly. This problem
has been corrected in the -current sources. In the mean time, FreeBSD users
should follow the instructions in the CERT advisory. Sendmail will compile
and operate "out of the box" on FreeBSD systems.
Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
Sendmail daemon problem:
Not Vulnerable HP-UX 9.X, 10.00, 10.01, 10.10
Vulnerable HP-UX 10.2 with PHNE_8702 Patches in process
IBM Corporation
===============
See the appropriate release below to determine your action.
AIX 3.2
-------
No fix required. AIX 3.2 sendmail is not vulnerable.
AIX 4.1
-------
No fix required. AIX 4.1 sendmail is not vulnerable.
AIX 4.2
-------
AIX 4.2 sendmail is vulnerable.
APAR IX63068 will be available shortly.
To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX63068
To Order
--------
APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist)
or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist,
reference URL:
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist".
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation.
Linux
=====
Linux has provided these URLs for S.u.S.E. Linux:
ftp://ftp.suse.de/suse_update/S.u.S.E.-4.3/sendmail
ftp://ftp.gwdg.de/pub/linux/suse/suse_update/S.u.S.E.-4.3/sendmail
Checksums for the files in these directories:
6279df0597c972bff65623da5898d5dc sendmail.tgz
0c0d20eecb1019ab4e629b103cac485c sendmail-8.8.3.dif
0cb58caae93a19ac69ddd40660e01646 sendmail-8.8.3.tar.gz
- -----
Caldera OpenLinux has released a security advisory, available from
http://www.caldera.com/tech-ref/cnd-1.0/security/SA-96.06.html
- -----
Red Hat has patched sendmail 8.7.6. The fixes are available from
Red Hat Linux/Intel:
rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.0/i386/sendmail-8.7.6-5.i386.rpm
Red Hat Linux/Alpha:
rpm -Uvh ftp://ftp.redhat.com/updates/4.0/axp/sendmail-8.7.6-5.axp.rpm
NeXT Software, Inc.
===================
NeXT is not vulnerable to the problem described in Section IV.A.
NeXT is vulnerable to the problem described in Section IV.B, and it
will be fixed in release 4.2 of OpenStep/Mach.
Open Software Foundation (OSF)
==============================
OSF/1 R1.3 is not vulnerable to this problem.
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
====================================
SCO is investigating the problem and will have more information in the
near future.
If we find that patches are needed, please check the following URLs
and this advisory appendix.
ftp://ftp.sco.com/SLS/README
ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/README
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
No Sun versions of sendmail are affected by this vulnerability.
-----
Appendix B - anti-smtpd.c
Below is the code for the anti-smtpd.c sendmail wrapper. Here is an example
of how to compile and install this wrapper. You may have to change these
commands for your system. Further, you may have to change the code for
anti-smtpd.c to get it to compile on your system. Finally, you may also have
to turn off sendmail before running these commands and then turn sendmail back
on after running them. Run these commands as root.
# mkdir /usr/hidden
# chmod 700 /usr/hidden
# mv /usr/lib/sendmail /usr/hidden/sendmail
# cc anti-smtpd.c -o anti-smtpd
# mv anti-smtpd /usr/lib/sendmail
# chmod u+s /usr/lib/sendmail
Here is the code for anti-smtpd.c:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <sysexits.h>
static char *Version = "Version 1.0 November 21, 1996";
/*
** Sendmail wrapper for CA-96:24 HUP to smtpd problem
**
** This is trivial -- it just ensures that sendmail cannot be
** invoked as smtpd.
**
** To install this, move the real sendmail into /usr/hidden,
** which should be a mode 700 directory owned by root. Install
** this program setuid root in place of sendmail.
*/
#ifndef REAL_SENDMAIL
# define REAL_SENDMAIL "/usr/hidden/sendmail"
#endif
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
char *p;
extern int errno;
if (argc < 1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sendmail: need a program name\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
p = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
if (p == NULL)
p = argv[0];
else
p++;
if (strcmp(p, "smtpd") == 0 && getuid() != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sendmail: cannot be invoked as smtpd\n");
syslog(LOG_ALERT, "sendmail: invoked as smtpd by %d", getuid());
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
execv(REAL_SENDMAIL, argv);
fprintf(stderr, "sendmail: cannot exec %s: errno = %d\n",
REAL_SENDMAIL, errno);
exit(EX_OSFILE);
}
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Eric Allman and AUSCERT for their
contributions to the development of this advisory.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University
This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided
it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is
included.
CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This file:
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.24.sendmail.daemon.mode
http://www.cert.org
click on "CERT Advisories"
[ END CERT Bulletin ]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of AUSCERT, CERT, Silicon
Graphics and Eric Allman for the information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 510-422-8193
FAX: +1 510-423-8002
STU-III: +1 510-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/
Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53)
Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles;
3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.
Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called ListProcessor, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
CIAC-BULLETIN, CIAC-NOTES, SPI-ANNOUNCE or SPI-NOTES for list-name and
valid information for LastName FirstName and PhoneNumber when sending
E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name LastName, FirstName PhoneNumber
e.g., subscribe ciac-notes OHara, Scarlett W. 404-555-1212 x36
You will receive an acknowledgment containing address, initial PIN,
and information on how to change either of them, cancel your
subscription, or get help.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained by sending email to
docserver@first.org with an empty subject line and a message body
containing the line: send first-contacts.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
G-45: Vulnerability in HP VUE
G-46: Vulnerabilities in Transarc DCE and DFS
G-47: Unix FLEXlm Vulnerabilities
G-48: TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks
H-01: Vulnerabilities in bash
H-02: SUN's TCP SYN Flooding Solutions
H-03: HP-UX_suid_Vulnerabilities
H-04: HP-UX Ping Vulnerability
H-05: Internet Hoaxes
H-06: Sun libc/libnsl Vulnerabilities (Sun Bulletin #00137)
RECENT CIAC NOTES ISSUED (Previous Notes available from CIAC)
Notes 07 - 3/29/95 A comprehensive review of SATAN
Notes 08 - 4/4/95 A Courtney update
Notes 09 - 4/24/95 More on the "Good Times" virus urban legend
Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability
in S/Key, EBOLA Virus Hoax, and Caibua Virus
Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators,
America On-Line Virus Scare, SPI 3.2.2 Released,
The Die_Hard Virus
Notes 12 - 9/12/95 Securely configuring Public Telnet Services, X
Windows, beta release of Merlin, Microsoft Word
Macro Viruses, Allegations of Inappropriate Data
Collection in Win95
Notes 96-01 - 3/18/96 Java and JavaScript Vulnerabilities, FIRST
Conference Announcement, Security and Web Search
Engines, Microsoft Word Macro Virus Update
TUCoPS is optimized to look best in Firefox® on a widescreen monitor (1440x900 or better).
Site design & layout copyright © 1986-2024 AOH
