M-017: Multiple SSH Version 1 Vulnerabilities
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
M-017: Multiple SSH Version 1 Vulnerabilities
November 16, 2001 00:00 GMT
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PROBLEM: |
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in SSH version 1, including a CRC32 compensation attack detector vulnerability (buffer overflow) and an unauthorized session key recovery problem.
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PLATFORM: |
SSH protocol Version 1.
This includes (but is not limited to):
SSH Communications Security SSH 2.x and 3.x (if configured with
version 1 Fallback enabled)
SSH Communications Security SSH 1.2.23-1.2.31
F-Secure SSH versions prior to 1.3.11-2
OpenSSH versions prior to 2.3.0 (if configured with version 1
Fallback enabled)
Cisco 11000 Content Service Switch Family
Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7.0, 8.0
RedHat Linux 6.2, 7.0
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DAMAGE: |
Potential root compromise.
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SOLUTION: |
Upgrade all SSH protocol version 1 servers to version 2. Do not enable Fallback to version 1 on the upgrades.
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VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT: |
The risk is HIGH. This is a remotely exploitable vulnerability, currently published on the Internet and can result in a root compromise.
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[****** Start CIAC Bulletin ******]
ATTACK DESCRIPTION:
There is some confusion on the current vulnerabilities in SSH version 1 and its
many platforms. There are actually several vulnerabilities currently being
exploited, which are fixed by upgrading versions of SSH version 1 to versions
using the SSH 2 protocol. Further, new servers with upgraded versions can
still be vulnerable if configured with Fallback to version 1 enabled. This
bulletin actually covers 2 of the more serious SSH version 1 vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability 1: SSH CRC32 Compensation Attack Detector Vulnerability
The SSH CRC32 compensation attack detector exploit consists of a buffer
overflow vulnerability in the SSH daemon (sshd). This vulnerability was
discovered by Michal Zalewski of Bindview in February 2001. Exploiting this
vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code without a
legitimate account or privileges on a target host.
Essentially, attackers first remotely scan a network using tools such as rapid
SYN scans for a response from port 22. This information is then used to
determine IP addresses and SSH versions of potentially vulnerable hosts (i.e.,
whether the host is running version 1 of SSH). The attackers then have enough
information to exploit this vulnerability and can obtain up to root privileges
on a vulnerable system. This is done by leveraging processes running Uid 0 to
obtain root. They "patch" the sshd on the victim client with the attacker's
version of SSH, complete with backdoors including listening ports for shell
access. All compromised systems show altered /usr/sbin/sshd files. Some
successfully compromised hosts (but not all) have /usr/sbin/atd, a backdoor
listening on port 56275 for password protected shell access.
Further technical description of this vulnerability is available at the
following sites:
http://razor.bindview.com/publish/advisories/adv_ssh1crc.html
http://www.securityfocus.com/cgi-bin/vulns-item.pl?section=info&id=2347
Vulnerability 2: SSH Protocol 1.5 Unauthorized Session Key Recovery
A second vulnerability is the ability to break the transient SSH version 1
server key responsible for negotiation of session encryption parameters; this
was discovered by CORE SDI S.A. The remote attacker initiates large numbers of
SSH 1 protocol connections to the SSH server and also captures encrypted SSH
version 1 sessions on that server. The session key is recovered by accessing
the SSH server rapidly, and obtaining information using a ciphertext
attack on the RSA encryption algorithm implemented in SSH version 1. Once
captured, the sessions can then be decrypted using the recovered session key.
This is a complex attack. A better and complete technical description of this
attack is available at the following site:
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/161150
RECOMMENDATIONS:
CIAC recommends reviewing all SSH servers and patching vulnerable SSH version 1
systems; most of the vulnerabilities have to do with the SSH
version 1 protocol. Remove any old legacy sshd version 1 binaries (i.e., those
not currently used). Do not enable SSH version 1 Fallback on updated systems
if at all possible (i.e., if SSH version 1 is not used). Note: systems with
upgraded versions of SSH, with Fallback to version 1 enabled are still vulnerable!
Patches and Upgrades are available at:
SSH Communications Security: http://www.ssh.com
F-Secure: http://www.f-secure.com/
OpenSSH: http://www.openssh.com
Cisco: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/index.shtml
[****** End CIAC Bulletin ******]
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Bindview for the
information contained in this bulletin.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE Contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7 x 24)
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
http://ciac.llnl.gov
(same machine -- either one will work)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
ciac.llnl.gov
(same machine -- either one will work)
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
UCRL-MI-119788
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