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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
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__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
NLS Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
April 24, 1997 21:00 GMT Number H-49
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A vulnerability exists in libraries using Natural Language
Service (NLS).
PLATFORM: AIX 4.2 and earlier
Linux libc 5.3.12 and earlier
DAMAGE: Local and possibility remote users may gain root privileges.
SOLUTION: Take the steps outlined in Section III as soon as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made
ASSESSMENT: publicly available.
______________________________________________________________________________
[****** Start CERT Advisory ******]
=============================================================================
CERT* Advisory CA-97.10
Original issue date: April 24, 1997
Last revised: --
Topic: Vulnerability in Natural Language Service
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a buffer overflow
condition that affects some libraries using the Natural Language Service (NLS)
on UNIX systems. By exploiting this vulnerability, any local user can execute
arbitrary programs as a privileged user. There is a possibility (with some old
libraries) that the vulnerability can be exploited by a remote user.
Exploitation information is publicly available.
The CERT/CC team recommends installing patches when they become available.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.
Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Description
A buffer overflow condition affects libraries using the Natural Language
Service (NLS). The NLS is the component of UNIX systems that provides
facilities for customizing the natural language formatting for the
system. Examples of the types of characteristics that can be set are
language, monetary symbols and delimiters, numeric delimiters, and time
formats.
Some libraries that use a particular environment variable associated with
the NLS contain a vulnerability in which a buffer overflow condition can
be triggered. The particular environment variable involved is NLSPATH on
some systems and PATH_LOCALE on others.
It is possible to exploit this vulnerability to attain unauthorized
access by supplying carefully crafted arguments to programs that are
owned by a privileged user-id and that have setuid or setgid bits set.
Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made
publicly available.
II. Impact
Local users (users with access to an account on the system) are able to
execute arbitrary programs as a privileged user without authorization.
There is a possibility (with some old libraries) that the vulnerability
can be exploited by a remote user.
III. Solution
Install a patch for this problem when one becomes available.
Currently, there is no workaround to use in the meantime.
Below is a list of vendors who have provided information about this
problem. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update the
appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name is not on
this list, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your
vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company
Data General Corporation
Digital Equipment Corporation
Hewlett-Packard Company
IBM Corporation
Linux Systems
NEC Corporation
NeXT/Apple
The Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)
Solbourne
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
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Appendix A - Vendor Information
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that
vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.
Berkeley Software Design, Inc. (BSDI)
=====================================
No versions of BSD/OS are vulnerable to this problem.
Cray Research - A Silicon Graphics Company
==========================================
We're investigating.
Data General Corporation
========================
We're investigating.
Digital Equipment Corporation
=============================
SOURCE:
Digital Equipment Corporation
Software Security Response Team
Copyright (c) Digital Equipment Corporation 1997. All rights reserved.
This reported problem is not present for Digital's ULTRIX or
Digital UNIX Operating Systems Software.
Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
Investigation in process, results -to date- indicate HP not
vulnerable. This advisory will be updated when investigation is complete.
IBM Corporation
===============
All AIX releases are vulnerable to a variation of this advisory.
AIX 3.2.5
---------
Apply the following fix to your system:
PTFs - U447656 U447671 U447676 U447682 U447705 U447723 (APAR IX67405)
To determine if you have these PTFs on your system, run the following
command:
lslpp -lB U447656 U447671 U447676 U447682 U447705 U447723
AIX 4.1
-------
Apply the following fix to your system:
APAR - IX67407
To determine if you have this APAR on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX67407
Or run the following command:
lslpp -h bos.rte.libc
Your version of bos.rte.libc should be 4.1.5.7 or later.
AIX 4.2
-------
Apply the following fixes to your system:
APAR - IX67377 IX65693
To determine if you have these APARs on your system, run the following
command:
instfix -ik IX67377 IX65693
Or run the following command:
lslpp -h bos.rte.libc
Your version of bos.rte.libc should be 4.2.0.11 or later.
(APAR IX65693 fixes a problem with the mkgroup command after IX67377
is applied.)
To Order
--------
APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist)
or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist,
reference URL:
http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/
or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist".
IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation.
Linux Systems
=============
Linux systems running older C libraries are vulnerable. To check which C
library is being used type
linux% ldd /bin/ls
libc.so.5 => /lib/libc.so.5.3.12
This indicates the machine is using libc 5.3.12.
C libraries older than 5.3.12 (that is libc5.2.18, libc5.0.9 etc) are
vulnerable to this bug and you should upgrade the C library. The release
versions of libc 5.4.x are immune to this attack.
If you have libc5.3.12 it is insecure unless it is the modified
libc5.3.12 shipped with Red Hat 4.1, or as an upgrade on Red Hat 4.0. You
can check this with the package manager:
linux# rpm -q libc
libc-5.3.12-17
Indicates you have version 17 of the package. This is the safe one.
Red Hat 4.0 users who have not already upgraded their libc can obtain
this package at
ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/old-releases/redhat-4.0/updates/.
NEC Corporation
===============
NEC platforms are not affected by this vulnerability.
NeXT/Apple
==========
No versions of NeXTstep of OpenStep/Mach are vulnerable to this problem.
The Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)
=============================
We are investigating this problem and will provide updated information
for this advisory when it becomes available.
Solbourne
=========
Solbourne is not vulnerable.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
======================
Not vulnerable.
[****** End CERT Advisory ******]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of CERT and Wolfgang Ley of DFN-
CERT for the information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
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