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COMMAND webMathematica directory traversal SYSTEMS AFFECTED webMathematica ?? PROBLEM In Andrew Badr security advisory : webMathematica generates images based on user input, often involving mathematical figures or signs which cannot be displayed using normal ascii-text. Generated images are named a long numeric string (randomly generated?) and are displayed in the page presented to the user. The ID of the image is passed to a cgi-script as an argument the URL, as shown below, and altering this ID can trick the script into displaying other files on the system. Encoded characters like %20 ( ), %22 (\"), %3B (;) are all decoded in the script but I can\'t find a way to escape the display command, whatever it is, to e.g. execute a file. For different file types, changing the MSPStoreType argument from \"image/gif\" to \"text\" may give better results. Exploit ======= Example normal URL: http://www.domain.com/webMathematica/MSP?MSPStoreID=MSPStore888808189_2408042780&MSPStoreType=image/gif Example exploited URL: http://www.domain.com/webMathematica/MSP?MSPStoreID=../../../../../etc/passwd&MSPStoreType=image/gif Note that the normal user would never see the above \'normal\' URL, as the URL only refers the generated image. It is found by viewing the page source, or through browser-specific methods. In Internet Explorer, for example, one would right-click on the generated image and click \'Properties\'. SOLUTION Workaround ========== Directly reference the generated image, thereby avoiding use of the \'MSP\' script. Patch ===== See http://www.wolfram.com/