19th Jun 2002 [SBWID-5466]
COMMAND
webMathematica directory traversal
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
webMathematica ??
PROBLEM
In Andrew Badr security advisory :
webMathematica generates images based on user input, often involving
mathematical figures or signs which cannot be displayed using normal
ascii-text. Generated images are named a long numeric string (randomly
generated?) and are displayed in the page presented to the user. The ID
of the image is passed to a cgi-script as an argument the URL, as shown
below, and altering this ID can trick the script into displaying other
files on the system.
Encoded characters like %20 ( ), %22 (\"), %3B (;) are all decoded in
the script but I can\'t find a way to escape the display command,
whatever it is, to e.g. execute a file.
For different file types, changing the MSPStoreType argument from
\"image/gif\" to \"text\" may give better results.
Exploit
=======
Example normal URL:
http://www.domain.com/webMathematica/MSP?MSPStoreID=MSPStore888808189_2408042780&MSPStoreType=image/gif
Example exploited URL:
http://www.domain.com/webMathematica/MSP?MSPStoreID=../../../../../etc/passwd&MSPStoreType=image/gif
Note that the normal user would never see the above \'normal\' URL, as
the URL only refers the generated image. It is found by viewing the
page source, or through browser-specific methods. In Internet Explorer,
for example, one would right-click on the generated image and click
\'Properties\'.
SOLUTION
Workaround
==========
Directly reference the generated image, thereby avoiding use of the
\'MSP\' script.
Patch
=====
See http://www.wolfram.com/
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