27th Feb 2002 [SBWID-5143]
COMMAND
BadBlue directory traversal and CSS, leading to a possible worm
vulnerability
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
- BadBlue Personal Edition (v1.5.6 Beta) for Win95/NT4
- BadBlue Personal Edition (v1.5.6 Beta) for Win98/2000/ME/XP
- BadBlue Enterprise Edition (v1.5.?) for Win95/NT4
- BadBlue Enterprise Edition (v1.5.?) for Win98/2000/ME/XP
- BadBlue Personal Edition (v1.6 Beta) for Win95/NT4
- BadBlue Personal Edition (v1.6 Beta) for Win98/2000/ME/XP
- BadBlue Enterprise Edition (v1.6 Beta) for Win95/NT4
- BadBlue Enterprise Edition (v1.6 Beta) for Win98/2000/ME/XP
- Deerfield D2Gfx (v1.0.2 - Effectively BadBlue v1.0.2) for Win9x/NT/2000/ME/XP
PROBLEM
In Strumpf Noir Society Advisories, two vulnerabilities has been found
regarding BadBlue, the technology behind Working Resources Inc.\'s
product line with the same name and which, amongst other things, also
powers Deerfield.com\'s D2Gfx file sharing community. (Working
Resources Inc. : http://www.badblue.com, Deerfield\'s D2Gfx : http://d2gfx.deerfield.com)
Directory Traversal
===================
The BadBlue server has in the past been found vulnerable to several
directory traversal attacks. One of these was the \"regular\"
double-dot traversal attack. We ourselves described another one in our
earlier advisory sns2k2-badblue2-adv, entitled \"BadBlue Scripting
Directory Traversal Vulnerability\". Working Resources Inc. has applied
fixes for both, however these can easily be circumvented.
Below described problem was identified during testing of the fix for
the issue we reported in sns2k2-badblue2-adv, which has just recently
been released. In our previous advisory we expressed the vendor\'s
intention to solve this problem in the next BadBlue release (not
forthcoming at the time), it is however important to note that this
release (v1.6) is vulnerable to below as well.
The problem lies in the fact that the BadBlue server filters the \"./\"
combination out of urls to prevent the directory traversal attacks
described. In doing so however, it leaves open a window of exploitation
for variations of these characters, which are not correctly removed
from input.
Example:
http://server/.../...//file.ext
The problem is obvious and allows an attacker to read any file on the
server.
Cross Site Scripting & Worm
============================
The BadBlue server technology does not adequately validate and filter
URL input from untrustworthy sources. This can be abused to create a
malicious link to the server containing arbitrary script code. When a
legitimate user browses the malicious link, the script code will be
executed in the user\'s browser. Extending on this problem, it is
possible for a remote attacker to gain control of any/all machines
performing searches on the network through a combination of this
problem and a weak authentication scheme.
Cross site scripting example:
http://server/<script>alert(\"doh!\")</script>
This problem is made worse due to the fact that it is also found in the
numerous administrative scripts coming with the server, which do not
filer URL input correctly either. The problem here is not so much that
script code can be executed in local pages, since there is no real
security hazard there. However, these scripts can be used to insert
script code into variables which are displayed when other users on the
filesharing network search the local machine for files. This will
execute the script in the browser of those (remote) users as well.
Since the server only checks the (local) ip used to authenticate a user
as the server admin, this script could well be used to execute commands
on remote machines running BadBlue. A quick piece of script we wrote as
a proof of concept was able to spread to remote machines doing a search
(no other user-interaction required!), create a user account on the
target server and \"phone home\" the details and hide itself, ready to
spread to a next machine.
SOLUTION
Vendor has been notified and has released BadBlue v1.6.1. It fixes
directory traversal, and fixes several, but not all, occurances of XSS.
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