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AppSecInc Security Alert: Buffer Overflow in UDP broadcasts for Microsoft SQL Server client utilities


Buffer Overflow in UDP broadcasts for Microsoft SQL Server client
utilities

Risk level: High

Summary:
A Unicode buffer overflow exists in MDAC which is used by the SQL Server
SQL-DMO library that could allow a remote user to execute malicious code
on the target computer. The vulnerability does not occur when accepting
incoming connections, but rather in the response to broadcast queries.

Details:
One of the features of the SQL Server network libraries is the ability
to query a list of SQL Servers on the local network. This is
accomplished by sending a UDP broadcast on port 1434 which will reach
all applications on the local subnet. This function is a component of
SQL-DMO which is used by the SQL Server Service Manager (whenever it is
started), Enterprise Manager (when registering a server), Query Analyzer
and SQL Profiler (when clicking "..." button), DTS (when selecting a SQL
Server), etc...

All SQL Servers receiving the broadcast request respond with a standard
UDP packet. If a malicious machine responds to this broadcast with an
overlong packet a stack buffer overflow occur. The overflow occurs in a
UNICODE string, so the Venetian method of performing a buffer overflow
would
need to be used to exploit this vulnerability. There is a white paper
from Chris Ansley on how this is done, as well as a presentation from
Dave Aitel.

Any SQL Server utilities that use the SQL-DMO function to retrieve a
list of SQL Servers will be vulnerable to this attack. An attack is not
mounted directly against the target. Instead an attacker could attempt
several methods of exploiting the vulnerability:

1) Setup a service listening for data on UDP port 1434 and responding
with the attack payload whenever data is received. This network would
require being on the same subnet.

2) Bombarding a remote subnet with UDP attack packets waiting for
someone to query the network. For example, send the attack packet every
2 seconds to 192.168.3.255 will reach all machines on the 192.168.3.x
subnet. When someone finally does send a UDP broadcast, they will accept
this packet and be exploited. This method would take a bit of luck,
persistence, or some social engineering.

3) It may also be possible for a non-privileged login in MS SQL to cause
the SQL Server to send out a query request directly to an IP Address on
the network. The following SQL statement causes the SQL Server to query
a host named SERVER with a UDP packet:

SELECT * FROM openrowset( 'SQLOLEDB', 'server=SERVER\instance
name;uid=sa;pwd=', '')

However, on our systems, we were unable to trigger the overflow from the
response. There may be other methods to cause the SQL Server to send the
UDP query and trigger the overflow.


One of the features of SQL Server which makes this vulnerability simpler
to exploit is that the SQL Server Service Manager queries the network
using SQL-DMO every time it starts which happens when a user with the
SQL Server client utilities logs into Windows. This would occur anytime
someone logged into the Windows server on which SQL Server is installed,
or anytime a database administrator logs into his or her machine.

Links:
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0353
http://www.microsoft.com/ technet/security/bulletin/MS03-033.asp

Fix:
This vulnerability affects the following packages:
Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7 SP1
Microsoft Data Access Components 2.7
Microsoft Data Access Components 2.6 SP2
Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 SP3
Microsoft Data Access Components 2.5 SP2

If you have one of these packages installed, apply the hot fix from
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;823718.

Acknowledgement:
Thanks to Cesar Cerrudo for researching this vulnerability!

Thank you,
support@appsecinc.com
Application Security, Inc.
phone: 212-420-9270
fax: 212-420-9680
-Protection Where It Counts-




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