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Vulnerability cgic library Affected Systems using cgic (mostly) Description Jon Ribbens found following. Thomas Boutell's cgic library (version 1.05) has a buffer overflow in cgiFormEntryString() which is almost certainly exploitable. (Although it obviously depends on the program that has linked with cgic.) The fault is because he is checking if 'len == avail' before examining each input character, but if the character is not CR or LF then 'len' is not checked after outputting the LFs but before outputting the character. (i.e. it checks that there is 1 byte free in the buffer, but then it can sometimes place 2 bytes in the buffer before checking again). i.e. if 'avail' is 'n' and the 'n-1'th character is LF or CR and the 'n'th character is *not* LF or CR then the character will be written at the end of the buffer (because avail == sizeofbuffer-1), and then len = avail + 1. Since he always checks for 'len == avail' rather than 'len >= avail', this means the overflow detection never kicks in, and the routine keeps copying until the end of the input. The attacker is free to copy whatever data they desire into the memory above the buffer. As an example, the cgictest program can be segfaulted by: $ REQUEST_METHOD=GET QUERY_STRING='address=<240 x letter 'A'>%0A<1000 x letter 'A'>' ./cgictest Content-type: text/html <HTML><HEAD> <TITLE>cgic test</TITLE></HEAD> <BODY><H1>cgic test</H1> Name: <BR> Address: <PRE> <lots of letter A's> Segmentation fault (core dumped) Oh, one other point is that the 'cgiSaferSystem' function appears to be seriously misguided. It is merely escaping the '|' and ';' characters, which is of course totally inadequate. Solution Seems to be solved. From Thomas Boutells site take a look at: http://www.boutell.com/cgic/#whatsnew106 Upgrading to version 1.06 is strongly recommended.