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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Microsoft Unchecked Buffer in SQL Server 2000 Utilities
Could Allow Code Execution
[Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-038]
July 26, 2002 15:00 GMT Number M-101
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Security Vulnerabilities were found in Microsoft SQL Server 2000
and Microsoft Desktop Engine 2000.
PLATFORM: Those running Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop
Engine (MSDE) 2000.
DAMAGE: The vulnerabilities enable users to run code on the server.
SOLUTION: Apply the patch as directed by the advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is LOW. The user must already have significant
ASSESSMENT: privileges such as being a db_owner or db_ddladmin, or
being able to log on through the server's keyboard.
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LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/m-101.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-038.asp
PATCHES: http://support.microsoft.com/support/misc/kblookup.asp?id=Q316333
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-038 *****]
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-038
Unchecked Buffer in SQL Server 2000 Utilities Could Allow Code Execution
(Q316333)
Originally posted: July 24, 2002
Summary
Who should read this bulletin: System administrators using Microsoft(r) SQL
Server(tm) 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine 2000.
Impact of vulnerability: Two vulnerabilities, both of which could enable
an attacker to run code on the server.
Maximum Severity Rating: Moderate
Recommendation: System administrators should consider installing the patch.
Affected Software:
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000.
* Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000
Technical details
Technical description:
This patch eliminates two newly discovered vulnerabilities affecting SQL
Server 2000 and MSDE 2000:
* A buffer overrun vulnerability that occurs in several Database
Consistency Checkers (DBCCs) that ship as part of SQL Server 2000. DBCCs
are command console utilities that allow maintenance and other operations
to be performed on a SQL Server. While many of these are executable only
by sysadmin, some are executable by members of the db_owner and db_ddladmin
roles as well. In the most serious case, exploiting this vulnerability would
enable an attacker to run code in the context of the SQL Server service,
thereby giving the attacker complete control over all databases on the
server.
* A SQL injection vulnerability that occurs in two stored procedures used in
database replication. One of these can only be run by users who have been
assigned the db_owner role; the other, due to a permissions error, could be
run by any user who could log onto the server interactively. Exploiting the
vulnerability could enable an attacker to run operating system commands on
the server, but is subject to significant mitigating factors as discussed
below.
Mitigating factors:
Buffer Overrun Vulnerability in Database Consistency Checkers:
* Both the db_owner and db_ddladmin roles carry with them significant
privileges, and only should be granted to trusted users.
* This allows the user to escalate privileges to the level of the service
account. And this escalation would be minimal if best practices were
followed and SQL were installed as a normal domain account.
SQL Injection Vulnerability in Replication Stored Procedures:
* Exploiting the vulnerability would, at a minimum, require that the
attacker have the ability to log onto the server interactively. However,
best practices strongly militate against giving such permissions to
untrusted users.
* Simply being able to run the affected stored procedures would not enable
an attacker to exploit the vulnerability. As discussed in the FAQ, the
vulnerability could only be exploited if the administrator had previously
enabled the SQL Server Agent Proxy account. By default, this account is
disabled.
* Even when enabled, the SQL Server Agent Proxy account has by default only
the privileges associated with a domain user. If administrators follow
best practices, it is likely that any user who could exploit the
vulnerability would already have this level of privilege.
Severity Rating:
Buffer Overrun Vulnerability in Database Consistency Checkers:
| Internet Servers | Intranet Servers | Client Systems |
SQL Server 2000 | Moderate | Moderate | None |
SQL Injection Vulnerability in Replication Stored Procedures:
| Internet Servers | Intranet Servers | Client Systems |
SQL Server 2000 | Low | Low | None
The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the
vulnerability, their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that
exploiting the vulnerability would have on them. The Buffer Overrun
vulnerability in Database Consistency Checkers has been rated as a
moderate-risk vulnerability because it could only be exploited by a user
who already had significant privileges on the system. The SQL Injection
vulnerability in replication stored procedures has been rated as a low-risk
vulnerability because it could not be exploited under default conditions.
Vulnerability identifiers:
* Buffer overrun vulnerability in Database Consistency Checkers: CAN-2002-0644
* SQL injection vulnerability in replication stored procedures: CAN-2002-0645
Tested Versions:
Microsoft tested SQL 7.0 and 2000 (and their associated versions of MSDE) to
assess whether they are affected by these vulnerabilities. Previous versions
are no longer supported, and may or may not be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Patch availability
Download locations for this patch
* SQL Server 2000:
http://support.microsoft.com/support/misc/kblookup.asp?id=Q316333
Additional information about this patch
Installation platforms:
This patch can only be installed on systems running SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 2.
Inclusion in future service packs:
The fix for this issue will be included in SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 3.
Reboot needed: No. The SQL Server and SQL Agent services only needs to be
restarted after applying the patch
Patch can be uninstalled: Yes. The readme.txt describing the installation
instructions also contains instructions on removing the patch.
Superseded patches: This patch supersedes the one provided in Microsoft Security
Bulletin MS02-034, which was itself a cumulative patch.
Verifying patch installation:
* To ensure you have the fix installed properly, verify the individual files by
consulting the date/time stamp of the files listed in the file manifest in
Microsoft Knowledge Base article at
http://support.microsoft.com/support/misc/kblookup.asp?id=Q316333
Caveats:
* This patch does not include the functionality of the Killpwd tool provided in
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-035.
* The patch also does not supersede any previously released patches for MDAC or
OLAP under SQL Server 2000. At this writing, these patches include the ones
discussed in:
* * Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-092
* * Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-041
* * Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-020
* * Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-030
* The process for installing the patch varies somewhat depending on the specific
configuration of the server. System administrators should ensure that they read
the Readme.txt file in the patch package to ensure the patch is installed
correctly.
Localization:
Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in
"Patch Availability".
Obtaining other security patches:
Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations:
* Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be
most easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch".
* Patches for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate web site
Other information:
Acknowledgments
Microsoft thanks Cesar Cerrudo for reporting this issue to us and working with us
to protect customers.
Support:
* Microsoft Knowledge Base article Q316333 discusses this issue and will be
available approximately 24 hours after the release of this bulletin. Knowledge
Base articles can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site.
* Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There
is no charge for support calls associated with security patches.
Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional
information about security in Microsoft products.
Disclaimer:
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is"
without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express
or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be
liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,
consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft
Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential
or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
Revisions:
V1.0 (July 24, 2002): Bulletin Created.
[***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-038 *****]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
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employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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