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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Cumulative Patch for Microsoft SQL Server
[Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-031]
July 24, 2003 20:00 GMT Number N-125
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: There are three newly discovered vulnerabilities:
1) Named Piped Hijacking - A flaw exists in the checking method
for the named pipe that could allow an attacker local to the
system running SQL Server to hijack (gain control of) the
named pipe during another client's authenticated logon
password.
2) Named Pipe Denial of Service - It is possible for an
unauthenticated user who is local to the intranet to send a
very large packet to a specific named pipe on which the
system running SQL Server is listening and cause it to become
unresponsive.
3) SQL Server Buffer Overrun - A flaw exists in a specific
Windows function that may allow an authenticated user—with
direct access to log on to the system running SQL Server—the
ability create a specially crafted packet that, when sent to
the listening local procedure call (LPC) port of the system,
could cause a buffer overrun.
SOFTWARE: * Microsoft SQL Server 7.0
* Microsoft Data Engine (MSDE) 1.0
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine (MSDE 2000)
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine (Windows)
DAMAGE: 1) Named Pipe Hijacking - This vulnerability would allow the
attacker to gain control of the named pipe at the same
permission level as the user who is attempting to connect.
If the user who is attempting to connect remotely has a
higher level of permissions than the attacker, the attacker
will assume those rights when the named pipe is compromised.
2) Named Pipe Denial of Service - This vulnerability would not
allow an attacker to run arbitrary code or elevate their
permissions, but it may still be possible for a denial of
service condition to exist that would require that the
server be restarted to restore functionality.
3) SQL Server Buffer Overrun - This could allow a user with
limited permissions on the system to elevate their
permissions to the level of the SQL Server service account,
or cause arbitrary code to run.
SOLUTION: Apply patch as stated in Microsoft's bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. These are the mitigating factors:
ASSESSMENT: 1) Named Pipe Hijacking - To exploit this flaw, the attacker
would need to be an authenticated user local to the system.
This vulnerability provides no way for an attacker to
remotely usurp control over the named pipe.
2) Named Pipe Denial of Service - To exploit this flaw the
attacker would require access to the local intranet.
Restarting the SQL Server will reinstate normal operations.
This flaw provides no method by which an attacker can gain
access to the system or information contained in the
database.
3) SQL Server Buffer Overrun - To exploit this flaw, the
attacker would need to be an authenticated user local to
the system. This vulnerability cannot be remotely exploited.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-125.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/
default.asp?url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-031.asp
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-031 *****]
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-031
Cumulative Patch for Microsoft SQL Server (815495)
Originally posted: July 23, 2003
Summary
Who should read this bulletin: System administrators using Microsoft®
SQL Server™ 7.0, SQL Server 2000, Microsoft Data Engine (MSDE) 1.0,
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine (MSDE 2000) and SQL Server
2000 Desktop Engine (Windows).
Impact of vulnerability: Run code of attacker's choice
Maximum Severity Rating: Important
Recommendation: System administrators should apply the security patch to
affected systems.
Affected Software:
* Microsoft SQL Server 7.0
* Microsoft Data Engine (MSDE) 1.0
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine (MSDE 2000)
* Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine (Windows)
Technical details
Technical description:
This is a cumulative patch that includes the functionality of all previously
released patches for SQL Server 7.0, SQL Server 2000, MSDE 1.0, and MSDE 2000.
In addition, it eliminates three newly discovered vulnerabilities.
* Named Pipe Hijacking
Upon system startup, SQL Server creates and listens on a specific named pipe
for incoming connections to the server. A named pipe is a specifically named
one-way or two-way channel for communication between a pipe server and one or
more pipe clients. The named pipe is checked for verification of which connection
attempts can log on to the system running SQL Server to execute queries against
data that is stored on the server.
A flaw exists in the checking method for the named pipe that could allow an
attacker local to the system running SQL Server to hijack (gain control of) the
named pipe during another client's authenticated logon password. This would allow
the attacker to gain control of the named pipe at the same permission level as the
user who is attempting to connect. If the user who is attempting to connect remotely
has a higher level of permissions than the attacker, the attacker will assume those
rights when the named pipe is compromised.
* Named Pipe Denial of Service
In the same named pipes scenario that is mentioned in the "Named Pipe Hijacking"
section of this bulletin, it is possible for an unauthenticated user who is local to
the intranet to send a very large packet to a specific named pipe on which the system
running SQL Server is listening and cause it to become unresponsive.
This vulnerability would not allow an attacker to run arbitrary code or elevate their
permissions, but it may still be possible for a denial of service condition to exist
that would require that the server be restarted to restore functionality.
* SQL Server Buffer Overrun
A flaw exists in a specific Windows function that may allow an authenticated user—with
direct access to log on to the system running SQL Server—the ability create a specially
crafted packet that, when sent to the listening local procedure call (LPC) port of the
system, could cause a buffer overrun. If successfully exploited, this could allow a
user with limited permissions on the system to elevate their permissions to the level
of the SQL Server service account, or cause arbitrary code to run.
Mitigating factors:
Named Pipe Hijacking:
* To exploit this flaw, the attacker would need to be an authenticated user local to
the system.
* This vulnerability provides no way for an attacker to remotely usurp control over the
named pipe.
Named Pipe Denial of Service:
* Although it is unnecessary that the attacker be authenticated, to exploit this flaw
the attacker would require access to the local intranet.
* Restarting the SQL Server will reinstate normal operations
* This flaw provides no method by which an attacker can gain access to the system or
information contained in the database.
SQL Server Buffer Overrun:
* To exploit this flaw, the attacker would need to be an authenticated user local to the
system.
* This vulnerability cannot be remotely exploited.
Severity Rating:
SQL 7.0 MSDE 1.0 SQL 2000 MSDE 2000 MSDE (Windows) Aggregate
Severity of all
Vulnerabilities
Named
Pipe
Hijacking Important Important Important Important Important Important
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Named
Pipe Denial
of Service Important Important Important Important Important Important
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
SQL Server
Buffer
Overrun Important Important Important Important Important Important
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the vulnerability,
their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that exploiting the vulnerability
would have on them.
Vulnerability identifier:
* Named Pipe HijackingCAN-2003-0230
* Named Pipe Denial of ServiceCAN-2003-0231
* SQL Server Buffer OverrunCAN-2003-0232
Tested Versions:
Microsoft tested SQL Server 7.0, MSDE 1.0, SQL Server 2000 SP3, SP3a, MSDE 2000
SP3 and MSDE (Windows) to assess whether they are affected by this vulnerability.
Previous versions are no longer supported, and may or may not be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Patch availability
Download locations for this patch
* Microsoft SQL Server 7.0
* Microsoft SQL 2000 32-bit Edition
* Microsoft SQL 2000 64-bit Edition
Additional information about this patch
Installation platforms:
This patch can be installed on systems running:
* The SQL Server 7.0 patch can be installed on systems running SQL Server 7.0
Service Pack 4. Additionally, the SQL Server 7.0 patch can be installed on systems
running MSDE 1.0 SP 4.
* The SQL Server 2000 patch can be installed on systems running Service Pack 3 or
Service Pack 3a. Additionally, the SQL Server 2000 patch can be installed on systems
running MSDE 2000 SP3.
* Windows Server 2003 users should obtain the patch for SQL Server Desktop Engine from
Windows Update.
Inclusion in future service packs:
The fix for this issue will be included in SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 4 and Windows
Server 2003 Service Pack 1.
Reboot needed: If the file(s) being updated by the patch are in use when the patch is
installed, you may be prompted to reboot. In most cases, a reboot will not be necessary.
Patch can be uninstalled: Yes. Microsoft Knowledge Base article 330391 provides
instructions for this.
Superseded patches: This patch supersedes the SQL 2000 SP2 and SQL 7.0 SP 4 version of
the patch provided in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-061, which was itself a
cumulative patch. MS02-061 fixes are already included in SQL 2000 SP3 and SP3a.
Verifying patch installation:
* SQL Server 7.0: To ensure you have the fix installed properly, verify the individual
files by consulting the date/time stamp of the files listed in the file manifest in
Microsoft Knowledge Base article at 815495
* SQL Server 2000: To ensure you have the fix installed properly, verify the individual
files by consulting the date/time stamp of the files listed in the file manifest in
Microsoft Knowledge Base article 815495
Caveats:
* The fix included in this security patch may cause non-administrative client
connections to a system running SQL Server 7.0 that is running on Windows NT 4.0
Server or on Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Services Edition to fail. Microsoft
Knowledge Base article 823492 addresses this problem in detail as well as provides
a fix for this specific problem.
* If you are running Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 Server Service Pack 6, you must
apply the hotfix that is described in 258437 before applying this patch. Q258437 is
now available for public download. See the Knowledge base article for more
information.
* This patch does not include the functionality of the Killpwd tool that is provided
in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-035.
* The patch does not supersede any previously released patches for MDAC or OLAP
under SQL Server 2000. At this writing, these patches include the ones discussed in:
* Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-092
* Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-041
* Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-030
* Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-040
Localization:
Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in “Patch
Availability”.
Obtaining other security patches:
Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations:
* Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be most
easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch".
* Patches for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate web site
Other information:
Acknowledgments
Microsoft thanks Andreas Junstream of @Stake for reporting this issue to us and
working with us to protect customers.
Support:
* Microsoft Knowledge Base article 815495 discusses this issue and will be available
approximately 24 hours after the release of this bulletin. Knowledge Base articles
can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site.
* Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There is no
charge for support calls associated with security patches.
Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional
information about security in Microsoft products.
Disclaimer:
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without
warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied,
including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In
no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages
whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business
profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been
advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or
limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing
limitation may not apply.
Revisions:
V1.0 July 23, 2003: Bulletin Created.
[***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-031 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
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