25th Feb 2002 [SBWID-5125]
COMMAND
pforum cross-site-scripting vulnerability
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
1.14 and maybe all versions before
PROBLEM
ppp-design [http://www.ppp-design.de] found the following :
pforum is a www-board system using php and mysql (http://www.powie.de).
Although the author seems to try to eliminate malicious code (eg.
unwanted html-code) in the input, he forget to check the username and
maybe some other inputs when registering a new user for malicious code.
Therefore it is possible for a malicious user to enter a username
containing javascript code. Because the userename ist displayed without
parsing out the javascript on several pages (eg. the page listing all
users), it is possible to access some other user\'s cookie containing
the sessionid.
More details
-------------
A typically user of pforum has enabled javascript (the side is using it
eg. for changing some icons), so it is possible that his sessionid gets
stolen by someone who has placed some malicious code in the forum.
Because the only way for an administrator to get aware of this sort of
attack is to look in the database or in the sourcecode of the board, it
is easy for a possible attacker not to be caught.
Proof-of-concept
-----------------
Just use this url (one line):
http://www.server.com/pforum/edituser.php?boardid=&agree=1&username=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E&nickname=test&email=test@test.com&pwd=test&pwd2=test&filled=1
This url generates a new users, which Username seems to be \"test\". In
fact, everywhere the username is displayed, the included javascript
code is placed, too. If some other user now goes to this page, he can
see his sessionid in a popup-box. Of course it is quite easy for a
blackhat to get this sessionid instead of displaying it in a popup-box
(eg. using a document.location.href in the javascript code and
referrers).
SOLUTION
Use new version
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