11th Sep 2002 [SBWID-5683]
COMMAND
Apple QuickTime ActiveX remote buffer overflow
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
Apple QuickTime ActiveX v5.0.2
PROBLEM
Ollie Whitehouse [ollie@atstake.com] with Andreas Junestam
[andreas@atstake.com] and Dave Aitel of @stake Inc.
[http://www.atstake.com] posted
[www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2002/a091002-1.txt] :
Apple QuickTime (http://www.quicktime.com) is the media player used by
a large number of distributors for high quality video and audio based
media. Version 5.0 has been downloaded over 100,000,000 times. There is
a buffer overrun caused by the way that the QuickTime ActiveX component
handles the "pluginspage" field when parsed from a malicious remote
orlocal HTML page. This can allow the execution of arbitrary computer
code on the computer viewing the malicious web page. The QuickTime
ActiveX component is commonly used for movie trailers (i.e. those
located at http://www.apple.com/trailers/) and other streaming or
static media technologies when they are embedded in a web page.
Details:
To exploit this vulnerability an attacker would need to get his or her
target to open a malicious HTML file as an attachment to an email
message, as a file on the local or network file system, or as a file
via HTTP. Most likely this would be accomplished by embedding a link to
a vulnerabile web site in an email message or another web page. If the
malicious HTML file is opened it will cause Quicktime to execute the
arbitrary computer code contained within the HTML page.
Take the following example HTML page:
---- Begin Sample HTML
<OBJ7ECT CLASSID="clsid:02BF25D5-8C17-4B23-BC80-D3488ABDDC6B"
WIDTH="480" HEIGHT="376">
<PA7RAM NAME="src" VALUE="test.mov">
<PA7RAM NAME="controller" VALUE="false">
<PA7RAM NAME="target" VALUE="myself">
<PA7RAM NAME="href" VALUE="test.mov">
<PA7RAM NAME="pluginspage" VALUE="insert overly long
string here">
<EM7BED WIDTH="480" HEIGHT="376" CONTROLLER="false"
TARGET="myself" HREF="test2.mov"
SRC="test.mov"
BGCOLOR="FFFFFF"
BORDER="0"
PLUGINSPAGE="insert overly long string here">
</EM7BED>
</OB7JECT>
---- End Sample HTML
[note: remove the '7's in the tags above to create valid HTML]
This sample HTML when, edited to insert an overly long string, will
cause an exception that is exploitable.
It is possible for an attacker to specify a codebase that will download
a vulnerable version of the ActiveX component.
This is a good example of why not to trust *ANY* ActiveX components
from any unknown source even if the site is considered safe and the
ActiveX component is signed on behalf of a trusted organization.
SOLUTION
Apple has resolved this issue within QuickTime 6 which can be
downloaded from :
http://www.apple.com/quicktime/
Recommendation:
If you use Quicktime, upgrade to Quicktime 6. If you are a web site
that hosts the qtplugin.cab file you should upgrade to version 6.
You should never open attachments/webpages that come from unknown
sources no matter how benign they may appear. Be wary of those that
come from known sources.
You can set the "kill bit" for a known vulnerable ActiveX component by
editting the registry. This will keep Internet Explorer from executing
the vulnerable component. Directions for setting the kill bit on a are
at:
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;EN-US;q240797&
You should consider the benefits and risks of each attachment file type
or ActiveX components that you let into your organization. Attachment
file types or ActiveX components that you do not need should be dropped
at your perimeter mail gateway or proxy server. Attachments that you
choose to forward on into your organization should be scanned for known
malicious code using an antivirus product.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
following names to these issues. These are candidates for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.
CAN-2002-0376 Apple QuickTime ActiveX v5.0.2 Buffer Overrun
@stake Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
http://www.atstake.com/research/policy/
@stake Advisory Archive:
http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/
PGP Key:
http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc
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