TUCoPS :: Windows :: n-077.txt

TUCoPS :: Windows :: n-077.txt
Microsoft Buffer Overrun in Kernel Message Handling (CIAC N-077)

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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN

Microsoft Buffer Overrun in Kernel Message Handling Vulnerability
[Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013]

April 16, 2003 19:00 GMT Number N-077
[Revised 28 May 2003]
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PROBLEM: A flaw has been discovered in the way the kernel passes error
messages to a debugger.
PLATFORM: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition
Microsoft Windows 2000
Microsoft Windows XP
DAMAGE: A local attacker could potentially gain elevated privileges,
including root privileges, and execute arbitrary code.
SOLUTION: Apply appropriate Microsoft patch.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. A local attacker could exploit this
ASSESSMENT: vulnerability to take any action on the system including
deleting data, adding accounts with administrative access, or
reconfiguring the system. The local attacker would need to be
able to logon interactively to the system, either at the
console or through a terminal session.
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LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-077.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url
=/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-013.asp
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[***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013 *****]

Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013

Buffer Overrun in Windows Kernel Message Handling could Lead
to Elevated Privileges (811493)
Originally posted: April 16, 2003

Updated: May 28, 2003

Summary
Who should read this bulletin: Administrators of Microsoft®
Windows NT® 4.0, Windows® 2000 and Windows® XP systems.

Impact of vulnerability: Local Elevation of Privilege

Maximum Severity Rating: Important

Recommendation: Customers should install the patch at the earliest
opportunity.

Affected Software:

Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server, Terminal Server Edition
Microsoft Windows 2000
Microsoft Windows XP
Non Affected Software:

Windows Server 2003
End User Bulletin: An end user version of this bulletin is available
at: http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ms03-013.asp.

Technical details
Technical description:

Microsoft re-issued this bulletin on May 28, 2003 to advise on the availability
of an updated Windows XP Service Pack 1 patch. This revised patch corrects the
performance issues that some customers experienced with the original Windows XP
Service Pack 1 patch.

Microsoft originally issued this bulletin on April 16, 2003. Subsequent to that
date, Microsoft received reports of performance problems with the patch from some
Windows XP Service Pack 1 customers. This original Windows XP Service Pack 1
patch did address the security vulnerability discussed in this security bulletin.
Microsoft investigated this performance issue and confirmed that there could be
performance problems when the original patch was applied to Windows XP Service
Pack 1 systems. Microsoft has published a Knowledge Base article, 819634, that
describes the known circumstances that can cause the performance problems to
manifest themselves with the original patch. Microsoft has subsequentially
re-issued the Windows XP Service Pack 1 patch to correct the performance
problems. This revised patch can be downloaded from the locations described later
in this bulletin.

The Windows kernel is the core of the operating system. It provides system level
services such as device and memory management, allocates processor time to
processes and manages error handling. There is a flaw in the way the kernel passes
error messages to a debugger. A vulnerability results because an attacker could write
a program to exploit this flaw and run code of their choice. An attacker could
exploit this vulnerability to take any action on the system including deleting data,
adding accounts with administrative access, or reconfiguring the system.

For an attack to be successful, an attacker would need to be able to logon
interactively to the system, either at the console or through a terminal session.
Also, a successful attack would require the introduction of code in order to exploit
this vulnerability. Because best practices recommends restricting the ability to logon
interactively on servers, this issue most directly affects client systems and terminal
servers.

Mitigating factors:

* A successful attack requires the ability to logon interactively to the target machine,
either directly at the console or through a terminal session.
* Properly secured servers would be at little risk from this vulnerability. Standard
best practices recommend only allowing trusted administrators to log onto such systems
interactively; without such privileges, an attacker could not exploit the vulnerability.

Severity Rating: Windows NT 4.0 Important
Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition Important
Windows 2000 Important
Windows XP Important
The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the vulnerability, their
typical deployment patterns, and the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would have
on them.

Vulnerability identifier: CAN-2003-0112

Tested Versions:
Microsoft tested Windows NT4, Windows 2000 and Windows XP to assess whether they are
affected by these vulnerabilities. Previous versions are no longer supported, and may or
may not be affected by these vulnerabilities.

Patch availability

Download locations for this patch

* Windows NT 4.0:

* All except Japanese NEC and Chinese - Hong Kong
* Japanese NEC
* Chinese - Hong Kong

* Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition:

* All

* Windows 2000:

* All except Japanese NEC
* Japanese NEC

* Windows XP:

* 32-bit Edition
* 64-bit Edition

Additional information about this patch

Installation platforms:

* The Windows NT 4.0 patch can be installed on systems running Service Pack 6a.
* The Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition patch can be installed on systems running
Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition Service Pack 6.
* The Windows 2000 patch can be installed on systems running Windows 2000 Service Pack 2
or Service Pack 3.
* The patch for Windows XP can be installed on systems running Windows XP Gold or Service
Pack 1.

Inclusion in future service packs:

The fix for this issue will be included in Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 and Windows XP
Service Pack 2.

Reboot needed: Yes

Patch can be uninstalled: Yes

Superseded patches:

* The Windows 2000 patch supercedes the Windows 2000 patch discussed in Microsoft
Security Bulletin MS03-007.
* The Windows NT 4.0 and Windows XP patches do not supercede any other patches.

Verifying patch installation:

* Windows NT 4.0:
To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that all files
listed in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 811493 are present on the system.

* Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition:
To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that all files
listed in the file manifest in Knowledge Base article 811493 are present on the system.

* Windows 2000:
To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that the following
registry key has been created on the machine:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP4\Q811493.

To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information provided in
the following registry key:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP4\Q811493\Filelist.

* Windows XP:

* If installed on Windows XP Gold:

To verify that the patch has been installed, confirm that the following registry key
has been created on the machine: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP1\Q811493.

To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information provided in the
following registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP1\Q811493\Filelist.

* If installed on Windows XP Service Pack 1:

To verify that the patch has been installed, confirm that the following registry key has
been created on the machine: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP2\Q811493.

To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information provided in the
following registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP2\Q811493\Filelist.

Caveats:
None.

Localization:
Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in “Patch
Availability”.

Obtaining other security patches:
Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations:

* Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be most
easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch".
* Patches for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate web site

Other information:

Acknowledgments
Microsoft thanks Oded Horovitz of Entercept™ Security Technologies for reporting this
issue to us and working with us to protect customers.

Support:

* Microsoft Knowledge Base article 811493 discusses this issue. Knowledge Base articles
can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site.
* Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There is no
charge for support calls associated with security patches.

Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional
information about security in Microsoft products.

Disclaimer:
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without
warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied,
including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages
whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business
profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been
advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or
limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing
limitation may not apply.

Revisions:

* V1.0 April 16, 2003: Bulletin Created.
* V1.1 April 17, 2003: Included correct patch supercedence information for Windows 2000.
* V1.2 April 23, 2003: Added information regarding performance related issues with
Windows XP SP1 patch
* V1.2 April 23, 2003: Added link to KB article that discusses performance related issues
with Windows XP SP1 patch
* V2.0 May 28, 2003: Re-issued to advise of availability of revised Windows XP SP1 patch
to correct performance issues

[***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-013 *****]

_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
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