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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Flaw in Microsoft Windows Message Handling through Utility Manager Could
Enable Privilege Elevation
[Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-025]
July 10, 2003 17:00 GMT Number N-116
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A security vulnerability exists in the way that Utility Manager
handles Windows messages because the control that provides the
list of accessibility options to the user does not properly
validate Windows messages sent to it. It's possible for one
process in the interactive desktop to use a specific Windows
message to cause the Utility Manager process to execute a
callback function at the address of its choice. Because the
Utility Manager process runs at higher privileges than the
first process, this would provide the first process with a way
of exercising those higher privileges.
SOFTWARE: Microsoft Windows 2000
DAMAGE: An attacker who had the ability to log on to a system
interactively could potentially run a program that could send a
specially crafted Windows message upon the Utility Manager
process, causing it to take any action the attacker specified.
This would give the attacker complete control over the system.
SOLUTION: Apply patch as stated in Microsoft's security bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. The attack cannot be exploited remotely,
ASSESSMENT: and the attacker would have to have the ability to
interactively log on to the system.
______________________________________________________________________________
LINKS:
CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/n-116.shtml
ORIGINAL BULLETIN:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/
default.asp?url=/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-025.asp
PATCHES:
http://microsoft.com/downloads/
details.aspx?FamilyId=D415A4AC-E13A-4E8A-BE25-85E7DF686F61
&displaylang=en
______________________________________________________________________________
[***** Start Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-025 *****]
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-025
Flaw in Windows Message Handling through Utility Manager Could
Enable Privilege Elevation (822679)
Originally posted: July 9, 2003
Summary
Who should read this bulletin: Customers using Microsoft® Windows® 2000
Impact of vulnerability: Privilege elevation
Maximum Severity Rating: Important
Recommendation: Customers should install the patch at the earliest
opportunity.
End User Bulletin: An end user version of this bulletin is available at:
http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ms03-025.asp.
Affected Software:
* Microsoft Windows 2000
Not Affected Software:
* Microsoft Windows Me
* Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0
* Microsoft Windows NT Server, Terminal Services Edition
* Microsoft Windows XP
* Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Technical details
Technical description:
Microsoft Windows 2000 contains support for Accessibility options within
the operating system. Accessibility support is a series of assistive
technologies within Windows that allow users with disabilities to still be
able to access the functions of the operating system. Accessibility support
is enabled or disabled through shortcuts built into the operating system,
or through the Accessibility Utility Manager. Utility Manager is an
accessibility utility that allows users to check the status of accessibility
programs (Microsoft Magnifier, Narrator, On–Screen Keyboard) and to start or
stop them.
There is a flaw in the way that Utility Manager handles Windows messages.
Windows messages provide a way for interactive processes to react to user
events (for example, keystrokes or mouse movements) and communicate with
other interactive processes. A security vulnerability results because the
control that provides the list of accessibility options to the user does not
properly validate Windows messages sent to it. It's possible for one process
in the interactive desktop to use a specific Windows message to cause the
Utility Manager process to execute a callback function at the address of its
choice. Because the Utility Manager process runs at higher privileges than
the first process, this would provide the first process with a way of
exercising those higher privileges.
By default, the Utility Manager contains controls that run in the interactive
desktop with Local System privileges. As a result, an attacker who had the
ability to log on to a system interactively could potentially run a program
that could send a specially crafted Windows message upon the Utility Manager
process, causing it to take any action the attacker specified. This would
give the attacker complete control over the system.
The attack cannot be exploited remotely, and the attacker would have to have
the ability to interactively log on to the system.
Mitigating factors:
* An attacker would need valid logon credentials to exploit the vulnerability.
It could not be exploited remotely.
* Properly secured servers would be at little risk from this vulnerability.
Standard best practices recommend only allowing trusted administrators to log
on to such systems interactively; without such privileges, an attacker could
not exploit the vulnerability.
Severity Rating: Windows 2000 Important
The above assessment is based on the types of systems affected by the
vulnerability, their typical deployment patterns, and the effect that
exploiting the vulnerability would have on them.
Vulnerability identifier: CAN-2003-0350
Tested Versions:
Microsoft tested Windows Me, Windows NT Server 4.0, Windows NT Server,
Terminal Server Edition, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 to
assess whether they are affected by these vulnerabilities. Previous versions
are no longer supported, and may or may not be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Patch availability
Download locations for this patch
* Microsoft Windows 2000:
http://microsoft.com/downloads/
details.aspx?FamilyId=D415A4AC-E13A-4E8A-BE25-85E7DF686F61&displaylang=en
Additional information about this patch
Installation platforms:
The Windows 2000 patch can be installed on systems running Windows 2000 Service
Pack 3. In addition, the fix for this issue is included in Windows 2000 Service
Pack 4.
Inclusion in future service packs:
The fix for this issue is included in Windows 2000 Service Pack 4.
Reboot needed: Yes
Patch can be uninstalled: Yes
Superseded patches: None.
Verifying patch installation:
* Windows 2000:
To verify that the patch has been installed on the machine, confirm that the
following registry key has been created on the machine:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP4\Q822679
To verify the individual files, use the date/time and version information
provided in the following registry key:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP4\Q822679\Filelist
Caveats:
None
Localization:
Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations discussed in
“Patch Availability”.
Obtaining other security patches:
Patches for other security issues are available from the following locations:
* Security patches are available from the Microsoft Download Center, and can be
most easily found by doing a keyword search for "security_patch".
* Patches for consumer platforms are available from the WindowsUpdate web site
Other information:
Acknowledgments
Microsoft thanks Chris Paget of Next Generation Security Software Ltd. for
reporting this issue to us and working with us to protect customers.
Support:
* Microsoft Knowledge Base article 822679 discusses this issue and will be
available approximately 24 hours after the release of this bulletin.
Knowledge Base articles can be found on the Microsoft Online Support web site.
* Technical support is available from Microsoft Product Support Services. There
is no charge for support calls associated with security patches.
Security Resources: The Microsoft TechNet Security Web Site provides additional
information about security in Microsoft products.
Disclaimer:
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is"
without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express
or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be
liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,
consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft
Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such
damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for
consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
Revisions:
* V1.0 (July 9, 2003): Bulletin Created.
[***** End Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-025 *****]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
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PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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