Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000⁰ Active Directory

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of the

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Warnings

- **Do not attempt to configure any of the recommendations in this guide without first testing in a non-operational environment.**

- This document is only a guide containing recommended security configurations. It is not meant to replace well-structured policy or sound judgment. Furthermore this guide does not address site-specific configuration issues. Care must be taken when implementing this guide while using products such as Microsoft Exchange, IIS, and SMS.

- The security changes described in this document only apply to **Microsoft Windows 2000** systems and should not be applied to any other Windows 2000 or Windows NT versions or operating systems.

- You can severely impair or disable a Windows 2000 system with incorrect changes or accidental deletions when using programs (Examples: Security Configuration Tool Set, `Regedt32.exe`, and `Regedit.exe`) to change the system configuration. Therefore, it is extremely important to test all settings recommended in this guide before installing them on an operational network.

- Currently, no Undo function exists for deletions made within the Windows 2000 registry. The registry editor (`Regedt32.exe` or `Regedit.exe`) prompts you to confirm the deletions if **Confirm On Delete** is selected from the options menu. When you delete a registry key, the message does not include the name of the key you are deleting. Therefore, check your selection carefully before proceeding with any deletion.

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Introduction

This document is a DRAFT only and may be incomplete. The purpose of this document is to provide Active Directory security configuration guidance and recommendations. **This draft is meant to be a starting point for Windows 2000 Active Directory security and does not include numerous Windows 2000 functions and applications associated with Active Directory.** This document is a companion to the "Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000: Security Configuration Tool Set" and other documents that comprise the overall NSA Windows 2000 guidance.

The following essential assumptions have been made to limit the scope of this document:

- The network consists only of machines running Microsoft Windows 2000 clean-installed machines (i.e. not upgraded) with the latest service pack.

- All network machines are Intel-based architecture.

- Applications are Windows 2000 compatible.

- Users of this guide have installed or have access to the Windows 2000 tools and utilities contained in the Microsoft Windows 2000 Server Resource Kit.

- Users of this guide have a working knowledge of Windows 2000 installation and basic system administration skills.

This document is intended for Windows 2000 network administrators, but should be read by anyone involved or interested in Windows 2000 or network security.

WARNING: This guide does not address security issues for the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system that are not specifically related to the Active Directory and its implementation.

Getting the Most from this Guide

The following list contains suggestions to successfully secure the Windows 2000 Active Directory according to this guide:

WARNING: This list does not address site-specific issues and every setting in this book should be tested on a non-operational network.

❑ Read the guide in its entirety. Omitting or deleting steps can potentially lead to an unstable system and/or network that will require reconfiguration and reinstallation of software.

❑ Perform pre-configuration recommendations:

   o Perform a complete backup of your system before implementing any of the recommendations in this guide

❑ Follow the security settings that are appropriate for your environment.

Commonly Used Names

Throughout this guide the network name "test.gov" and the subnet 192.168.0 may be used in the examples, screenshots, and listings.

WARNING: It is extremely important to replace "test.gov" and 192.169.0 with the appropriate network name and subnet for the networks being secured. These names are not real networks and have been used for demonstration purposes only.

About the Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000: Active Directory

This document consists of the following chapters:

Chapter 1, "Active Directory Overview," discusses the approach of the Active Directory Mini-guide and provides some topology considerations.

Chapter 2, "Domain Name System,'' provides guidance about the Domain Name System (DNS) as it relates to Active Directory. Information about Active Directory DNS security functionality and requirements is provided; bugs and incompatibilities are pointed out.

Chapter 3, "Active Directory Installation," explains Active Directory installation requirements and security issues.

Chapter 4, "**Domains and Organizational Units,**" illustrates the security properties of a domain as an Active Directory container object. Active Directory object access control is explained, and domain controller physical security and vulnerability issues are discussed.

Chapter 5, "Trees and Forests," explains how multiple domains can be configured using Active Directory trusts.

Chapter 6, "Object Access Control," discusses Active Directory object security.

Chapter 7, "Replication," discusses replication conflicts that can occur and how to minimize conflicts. Active Directory site issues are explored.

Chapter 8, "Operations Masters," provides placement guidelines for managing the various operations masters and the Global Catalog.

Chapter 9, "Auditing," tells how to audit an Active Directory container or leaf object and how to view and manage audit output.

Chapter 10, "Backup/Restore and Database Maintenance," discusses security issues related to backup/restore and restore mode password protection.

Append A, "References," contains a list of resources cited.

Comments

As this document is a work in progress, comments, suggestions, questions, and bug reports are welcome and encouraged. Send an email to W2KComments@dewnet.ncsc.mil describing the issue in detail. In order to allow ample time to research problems, email is preferred to phone calls.

Chapter

1

Active Directory Overview

Active Directory is the directory service used for Windows 2000 domain controllers. According to Microsoft, a *directory* is a source used to store information about objects. A *directory service* includes both the information source and the services making the information available to users.

In its simplest definition, Active Directory is a hierarchical namespace of objects that is tightly integrated with the Domain Name System (DNS). Active Directory holds information on objects stored in underlying domains, trees, and forests. Active Directory also provides mechanisms for safeguarding directory objects from unauthorized access.

Since Active Directory holds the important pieces of information for a Windows 2000 network, special care must be taken to protect its integrity and contents.

The Active Directory mini-guide is intended to highlight Windows 2000 Active Directory security capabilities and issues and provide security configuration guidance and recommendations for system administrators. The reader is assumed to have basic knowledge of Windows 2000 configuration and the role Active Directory plays in a Windows 2000 network. This is a companion volume to other mini-guides that are part of the overall NSA *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000.* Because the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000* is intended to provide guidance and tools to improve the security configuration of Windows 2000 systems in a "typical" operational environment, it does not advocate specific design or integration policies.

The approach of this mini-guide is somewhat different than the approach of other security guides. Some guides provi de discrete settings that implement a predictable security configuration outcome. The recommendations provided in this mini-guide are somewhat more flexible and are intended to inform administrators and to aid decision-makers in arriving at their own policy implementations.

Active Directory Overview

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Chapter

2

Domain Name System (DNS)

Active Directory uses the Domain Name System (DNS) for name resolution, to locate services, and to establish the domain namespace for the Active Directory hierarchy. DNS affects the design of the organizational layout including forests, trees, domains, and sites. For this reason, DNS should be the first concept designed. DNS design should not be taken lightly because Active Directory does not currently allow the naming convention to be changed without completely re-installing Active Directory for all affected domains.

This section provides guidance on the Domain Name Service (DNS) as it relates specifically to Active Directory. Additional DNS guidance can be found in the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 DNS* mini-guide.

> **NOTE: Active Directory requires DNS Service Resource Record (SRV RR) support and BIND 8.1.2 or higher.**

DNS can be configured via the DNS Installation Wizard. The wizard can be used to perform the following functions:

- Install the DNS Server Service

- Create a forward lookup zone

- Configure the zone as Active Directory Integrated

- Enable secure dynamic updates for the zone

Active Directory Integrated Zones

Active Directory integrated zones allow access control over who can update DNS and provide better replication and fault tolerance capability. Using Active Directory integrated zones, the DNS server properties interface can be used to manage Access Control Lists (ACLs) for which groups and users can access and modify a specified zone or resource record.

Figure 1 DNS Security Tab

The DNS server properties security tab can be used to link users and the designated DNS administrators groups, such as the DnsAdmins group shown in **Figure 1**, and to configure permissions. Groups and users can then be placed into a designated Organizational Unit (OU) or other container so that the appropriate Group Policy Object (GPO) can be applied (see also the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy* mini-guide).

With directory-integrated storage, dynamic zone updates are propagated within the multi-master Active Directory replication scheme. This avoids the traditional DNS master server becoming a single point of failure. Furthermore, zones are replicated and synchronized to new domain controllers automatically whenever a new zone is added to an Active Directory domain.

Active Directory DNS Interface

The Active Directory DNS interface allows administrators to specify the servers allowed to participate in zone transfers. The DNS interface also allows logging and monitoring of certain events. Captured DNS audit events are viewable from the "DNS Server" log in the Event Viewer.

Enabling only secure DNS updates at a server causes all updates to the particular server to be encrypted during transmission over the network. Microsoft has published a warning about how a DHCP server can compromise secure dynamic updates.

WARNING: In the Windows 2000 on-line help for *Dynamic Update* is the following caution: "For Windows 2000, the use of secure dynamic updates can be compromised by running

a DHCP server on a domain controller when Windows 2000 DHCP server is configured to perform registration of DNS records on behalf of its clients. To avoid this issue, deploy DHCP servers and domain controllers on separate computers. If you are not concerned about security of reverse lookup (PTR) records, this precaution is only advisable if the DHCP server is configured to perform registration of host (A) records on behalf of its clients (which is not a default behavior)."

Static Service Locations

Instead of using dynamic service location, Active Directory uses static service locations. This leads to a problem where service records remain in DNS after a service has been removed or otherwise become unavailable – servers and clients will continue to believe that the service is still available.

To address this problem, Microsoft provides a proprietary server aging/scavenging solution that makes use of a previously unused DNS extension. The aging/scavenging functionality allows Active Directory DNS servers to age out and remove old DNS service records. The default time is seven days. One problem with this is that services will appear available to servers and clients until they have been scavenged (this problem may also affect locating new services). Another problem is that non-Windows 2000 DNS servers do not have the ability to age or scavenge old service records. This issue must be considered when deciding if or how to implement DNS in a non-Windows 2000 DNS server or mixed DNS server environment.

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

❑ Implement Active Directory integrated zones.

❑ Use or create Active Directory DNS administrators groups and users to manage DNS.

❑ Link only the designated DNS administrators groups and users and configure permissions through the DNS server properties security tab.

❑ Place the DNS administrators groups and users into a designated Organizational Unit (OU) and apply the appropriate Group Policy.

❑ See also the *Guide to Securing Windows 2000 DNS* mini-guide.

Good Practices

❑ Configure support for dynamic updates and incremental zone transfers.

❑ Enable secure dynamic updates for the zone.

❑ Routinely check currency of service records and manually scavenge as needed.

❑ Make use of the Windows 2000 DNS installation wizard when creating zones.

❑ Become familiar with and test issues regarding interoperating with non-Windows 2000 DNS servers, such as SRV RR support, service record aging and scavenging, and version stability.

❑ Create an enterprise DNS audit policy; use Active Directory DNS interface to log and monitor DNS events.

❑ Use more than one DNS server to host each zone, for fault tolerance.

❑ DNS servers should be local, not across a site connection (i.e., not across a WAN or slow-speed link).

Domain Name System

Chapter

3

Active Directory Installation

After installing a Windows 2000 server product (server, advanced server, or data center), the server can be promoted to a domain controller by installing Active Directory. Active Directory is installed using the Active Directory Installation Wizard. This wizard is launched by running `DCPROMO.EXE` from the command prompt or by running **Configure Your Server** on the Administrative Tools menu of the **Start** menu. The Active Directory Wizard can perform the following functions:

- Add a domain controller to an existing domain

- Create the first domain controller of a new domain

- Create a new child domain

- Create a new domain tree

- Install a DNS server with a default configuration

- Create the database and database log files

- Create the shared system volume

- Remove Active Directory services from a domain controller

It is recommended that Active Directory domain, Organization Unit (OU), and site topologies be carefully considered before Active Directory installation. It is also recommended that DNS services be installed and configured prior to Active Directory installation unless the default Active Directory Installation Wizard DNS configuration is acceptable. For further guidance, see also the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 DNS* mini-guide and the DNS section of this mini-guide.

Active Directory Default Permissions

During Active Directory installation, a dialog box prompts for one of the following two permission preferences (see **Figure 2**):

Figure 2 Active Directory Default Permissions

- Permissions compatible with pre-Windows 2000 servers
- Permissions compatible only with Windows 2000 servers

Permissions should be set to be compatible only with Windows 2000 servers, if possible. Permissions compatible with pre-Windows 2000 servers allows anonymous users read access to information on the domain.

No matter which option is selected, the built-in Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group is added in the access control lists (ACLs) and user rights throughout Active Directory and the domain controller. However, with the first option, permissions compatible with pre-Windows 2000-based servers are selected, and the Everyone group is nested in the Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group, which allows anonymous connections to the server. With the second option, the Everyone group is not nested.

To later change this permission setting to be compatible with pre-Windows 2000 or only with Windows 2000 servers, the Everyone group can be added or deleted from the Pre-Windows 2000 Compatibility Access group. The following run commands will add or delete the Everyone group:

- ```
  net localgroup "Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access" everyone /add
  ```

- ```
  net localgroup "Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access" everyone /delete
  ```

If pre-Windows compatible access is needed for a mixed-mode Windows 2000/NT environment, steps should be taken to reduce exposure to Everyone group access. See also the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy: Security Configuration Toolset* mini-guide for more information on limiting permissions of the Everyone group.

Directory Services Restore Mode

During Active Directory installation, a value for the Directory Services Restore Mode Administrator's password is supplied. The Directory Services Restore Mode Administrator's password is used to restore the Active Directory database from a backup and to protect access to the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit) stored on the server. Therefore, it is important to protect this password. The restore mode password, unlike typical Windows 2000 group and user passwords, is stored in the server's local Security Accounts Manager (SAM) data store. Therefore, good password management guidelines should be used to reduce the effectiveness of password-cracking utilities against this password. SYSKEY can be used to provide additional protection of the SAMs of all domain controllers. SYSKEY is discussed in greater detail later in this guide.

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

❑ Set permissions compatible only with Windows 2000 servers, if possible (i.e., if not in mixed-mode).

❑ Use robust password guidelines (e.g., length, complexity) when setting the Directory Services Restore Mode Administrator's password. Consider using SYSKEY for additional security.

Good Practices

❑ Carefully consider Active Directory topologies before installing Active Directory.

❑ DNS services should be installed and configured prior to Active Directory installation, unless the default configuration is acceptable.

Domains and Organizational Units

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Chapter

4

Domains and Organizational Units

As stated earlier, Active Directory is a hierarchical structure. Domains are the fundamental container objects in Active Directory. Within domains, Organizational Units (OUs) are created to further organize objects.

This chapter discusses the security concerns specifically related to domains and OUs.

Domain Basics

Windows 2000 domains maintain backward compatibility with Windows NT domains and must match DNS names. Active Directory domains represent a security boundary or partition because permissions and authority do not flow in or out of a domain. Permissions can, however, flow in and out of sites and Organizational Units (sites are discussed in the Replication section).

Figure 3 Domain and OU Structure

An OU is typically created within the domain to further organize and contains individual resource objects (leaf objects) such as users, computers, and shared folders. OUs are illustrated as "directory folder" objects within a domain triangle in **Figure 3**. OUs are the primary container object used to delegate authority and to link Group Policy Objects (GPOs). The other container objects used to delegate authority and link to GPOs are domains and sites.

When creating a new child domain, the Active Directory Installation Wizard:

- Creates a new domain

- Promotes the computer to a new domain controller
- Establishes a transitive, two-way trust relationship with the parent domain
- Replicates schema and configuration directory partitions

Domain Administrators

Within the domain, domain administrators (members of the Domain Admins group and the built-in Administrator account) not only have full control by default, they also have the right to take ownership of any object in the domain. Using this right, domain administrators can gain full control over any object in the domain, regardless of the permissions that have been set on that object. Specifically, there is no way to prevent a domain admin or administrator from being able to take ownership (control) of an OU anywhere in the domain. The Active Directory interface indicates that blocking or denying permissions is effective in blocking out any group or user including domain administrators, which is misleading.

Because domain administrators have full control throughout the domain, membership of the domains administrators group should be kept small and controlled. Also, members of the domain administrators group should not be placed in OUs to manage sub-domain elements of the directory tree. One approach for delegating administration within a domain is as follows:

- Create an OU for each logical subdivision of the domain
- Create a local group for each subdivision representing the highest level administration in that subdivision
- Assign the given group full control over its OU
- If the subdivision is allowed to set their membership, place the subdivision's administrators group into the OU. Otherwise, leave the group outside the OU.

Group Policy Objects

When an object is created in the directory, a default access control list (ACL) is applied. The default ACL is described in the schema definition of the object class. Beyond these default permissions, security management for Active Directory user and computer objects is largely performed with Group Policy Objects (GPOs) that are linked (applied) to domain, OU and site container objects. Additional Group Policy guidance can be found in the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy* mini-guide.

By default, GPOs are inherited. Inheritance flows from site to domain to OU. Child OUs, for example, inherit GPOs from parent OUs. There is no GPO inheritance hierarchy for domains as there is for OUs, such as from parent OU to child OU and so forth. **Figure 4** illustrates GPO inheritance.

Figure 4 GPO Inheritance

Default Users and Computers

When Active Directory is installed on the first domain controller in a new domain, several default objects are created. These objects include Builtin, Computers, and Users folders. Because effective Active Directory management depends on implementing an OU structure within a domain for delegation of administrative control and Group Policy, the default users and computers folders should only be used, if needed, to initially plan and create a manageable OU structure. As soon as possible, user and computer objects should be relocated to OUs within the target structure.

Hiding Active Directory Objects in OUs

OUs can be created to hide objects. Blocking the "List Contents" permission for an OU makes the OU and its contents invisible to affected users. Only users who can modify the access control list (ACL) on an OU can hide objects in this way. This feature can be used to compartment the logical structure of the directory to meet management policies and objectives. On the negative side, this feature also could be used to "backdoor" a system, i.e., to create a privileged user and place that user into a hidden OU container.

When an administrator attempts to view a hidden OU, the OU object will appear as an object without an icon. When the object's security tab is selected, the security information will be unavailable. These are the indications to administrators that an OU has been created to hide Active Directory objects. If such activity is suspicious, the administrator can perform the following steps to regain control of the hidden object:

- Open another object to which the administrator has privilege
- View the security settings of the other object
- Return to view the security tab of the hidden object
- The security settings will now be visible and can be managed by the administrator

- The administrator can now grant other objects rights to this OU

- The administrator can now reset inherited permissions

The steps to find and take control of hidden OU objects must be done manually.

Domain Controller Security

Domain controllers contain sensitive information, such as copies of users' secret keys used for domain authentication. Therefore, the security of domain controllers should be a high priority.

Physical Security

Having fewer copies of domain controller information physically accessible to unsupervised persons reduces the risk for unauthorized access. Domain controllers must be kept physically secure from unauthorized access. For example, it is recommended that domain controllers be located in a locked room with limited access. Physical access can allow an intruder to obtain copies of encrypted password data to use for an off-line password attack.

SYSKEY Concerns

The use of SYSKEY introduces additional security and ease of use issues, as described by Microsoft in http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q143/4/75.asp. For example, SYSKEY uses its own key that must also be protected. Because the SYSKEY binary key is needed to boot a domain controller (computer), if a floppy disk containing the binary key were stored insecurely near the target machine, for example, it could be used to bypass SYSKEY. Unattended system restart could require that the SYSKEY material be stored on the local hard drive so that the system can be restarted without Administrator response, thus reducing the level of security. If the SYSKEY password is forgotten or the removable media is lost, it may not be possible to start the system. Also, SYSKEY could affect repair options for system recovery. **Figure 5** shows the options for the storage of SYSKEY startup keys.

Figure 5 SYSKEY Password Storage

Fault Tolerance

Immediately after Active Directory is installed on the first domain controller, at least one additional domain controller should be installed to prevent loss of the database if the first server crashes.

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

❑ Create separate domains as needed to partition or compartment portions of Active Directory requiring different security or administrative policies.

❑ Physically secure domain controllers.

❑ As soon as possible, move default user and computer objects into OUs within the target OU structure.

Good Practices

❑ Membership of the domain administrators group should be kept small and controlled.

❑ Members of the domain administrators group generally should not be placed in OUs to manage sub-domain elements of the directory tree.

❑ Take steps to ensure that unauthorized hidden OU objects do not exist within the directory structure.

❑ Use SYSKEY to augment the physical protection of domain controllers.

❑ At least one sub-domain or replica domain controller should be installed shortly after the first domain controller is installed to prevent loss of the database if the first server crashes.

Domains and Organizational Units

Chapter

5

Trees and Forests

A tree is a collection of domains, connected by trust relationships, which share a contiguous DNS namespace. A forest is a collection of domains, connected by trust relationships, whose DNS namespace is not contiguous. All domains in trees or forests have the following in common:

- **Global Catalog** - Holds a copy (replica) of every object in Active Directory, but with a limited number of each object's attributes. The Global Catalog stores those attributes most frequently used in search operations and user logon, and attributes required to locate a full replica of the object.

- **Schema** - Defines the classes and attributes of objects that can be created in the Active Directory database.

- **Configuration** - A naming context that is replicated to every domain controller in the forest. The Configuration holds and uses site information to make connections.

Design Considerations

In Active Directory, the first domain created is the root domain controller, tree root domain, and forest root domain, even though there is only one domain. The first domain controller stores the Global Catalog, Schema and Configuration. As the forest root domain, the two predefined security groups created to manage forests are:

- **Enterprise Admins -** A universal group if the domain is in native mode, a global group if the domain is in mixed mode. This group is authorized to make changes to the entire forest in Active Directory, such as adding child domains.

- **Schema Admins -** A universal group if the domain is in native mode, a global group if the domain is in mixed mode. This group is authorized to make schema changes in Active Directory.

In Active Directory, DNS, tree, and forest implementation hinges on the first domain created. Subdomains and Active Directory trees that will be included in a forest must be linked with the first domain as their Active Directory configurations are installed. An established domain or tree cannot later join a forest. Although non-transitive trust relationships can be provided to established domains, trees and forests, the preferred Active Directory two-way, transitive trust relationship is not available to domains and trees that were not installed into the forest root domain.

Active Directory is a new technology and does not yet provide tools or methods to change or add flexibility to tree and forest design. Most tree and forest implementations are permanent and cannot be changed or undone without reinstalling domain controllers or entire trees. Significant planning must be done before creating the DNS namespace, trees, and forests.

After the first domain is created, subsequent Active Directory installations within a forest can accomplish the following:

- Create a replica within a domain

- Create a subdomain that extends the namespace

- Create a subdomain with a non-contiguous namespace

When subsequent domain controllers are installed, Active Directory will begin to exchange copies or replicas of the Global Catalog, Schema, and Configuration among the domain controllers. Within a domain, large portions of these databases are exchanged. Between domains only the changes or updates are exchanged.

Advantages of a Single Domain Architecture

The primary advantage of having a single domain for the entire system or enterprise is to simplify system management. The security benefits of a single domain system include the following:

- It is easier to manage and trace Active Directory object access control and Group Policy inheritance since permissions are contained within the domain boundary.

- Domain administrators have complete control over the entire system because they cannot be blocked out of containers.

Advantages of a Multiple Domain Architecture

Some general and security-related benefits of having multiple domains in the system or enterprise include the following:

- Multiple domains can reduce replication traffic since replication between domains only involves changes to the Active Directory database

- It might be easier to implement distinct security settings by using separate domains

- Multiple domains might aid in the transition from Windows NT domains to Windows 2000 domains

- Separate domains may be required to block administrative authority from one part of a system to another

Active Directory Trusts

As each new domain controller is installed into a forest, Active Directory automatically and transparently creates a two-way, transitive trust between the forest root or the parent domain and the new domain. Because the trust is two-way, the trust paths between the domains extend in both directions. Because the trust is transitive, the trust relationship is extended to all domains that are connected together with a transitive trust. Transitive trusts can be distinguished as either parent-child trusts, or as trusts between tree roots. **Figure 6** shows trust relationships within a forest.

Trees and Forests

Figure 6 Forest Trust Relationships

Kerberos V5 verifies trust relationships in Active Directory. When a user in a trusted domain tries to access a resource in another domain, the user's computer contacts the domain controller in its local domain to get authentication to the resource. If the resource is not in the user's domain, the local domain controller uses the trust relationship with its parent to refer the requesting computer to the parent domain controller. This chain of requests continues through the trust hierarchy until the request reaches the domain in which the resource resides. Kerberos is further described in the Kerberos mini-guide.

Within a forest, a shortcut trust can be created to reduce the length of the trust hierarchy between network resources.

Non-transitive Trusts

A non-transitive, or one-way, trust can be created between Active Directory domains where a transitive trust relationship does not or cannot exist. Care must be taken when explicitly establishing a one-way trust. Only necessary trusts should be created.

Non-transitive trusts can be used in the following situations:

- Between a Windows 2000 domain and a Windows NT domain.

- Between a Windows 2000 domain in one forest and a Windows 2000 domain in another forest.

- Between a Windows 2000 domain and a Kerberos V5 protocol security realm.

Non-transitive trusts are manually created and are one-way, although a one-way non-transitive trust can be created for both directions to accomplish a two-way non-transitive trust relationship.

Trusts can be viewed, verified, or removed in Active Directory Domains and Trusts as follows:

- Select **Start ? Programs ? Administrative Tools ? Active Directory Domains and Trusts**

- Right-click a domain and click **Properties**. The domains trusted by this domain and the domains that trust this domain are visible

To verify a trust relationship:

- From the **Trusts** tab, select a domain to verify and click **Edit**

- Click **Verify/Reset**

To remove a trust:

- From the **Trusts** tab, select a domain to remove and click **Remove**

Trusts Between Multiple Forests

It is possible to link multiple forests together with non-transitive trust relationships. Linking multiple forests may be necessary due to any number of circumstances such as organizations or companies merging together or operational needs to merge systems that were previously separate. While there is yet no graceful forest merge capability with Active Directory, system decision-makers are basically faced with the following choices:

- Maintain separate forests

- Manually recreate and copy objects from one forest to another

Some of the consequences of having multiple forests include the following:

- There will be multiple schemas. Maintaining consistency between them will create overhead and be difficult.

- There will be multiple Configuration containers. Network topology changes will have to be replicated to each affected forest, and maintaining consistency will create overhead.

- Explicit trusts between individual domains will need to be established and maintained. There are no transitive trusts between forests, so multiple domains requiring inter-forest trust relationships will require a mesh of one-way explicit trusts.

- Users will need to make explicit queries for resources outside their forest.

- Any replication of information between forests will be manual and will require an administrative process for keeping such information up-to-date.

- Users logging on to computers in forests outside their own must use the default (full domain path) UPN when logging on.

- Accounts cannot be easily moved between forests. Account moves between forests must use cloning or a bulk import utility.

> **NOTE: When user accounts are bulk imported, the pre-import account password cannot be preserved. It is possible to specify a new password during the bulk import, but managing unique passwords for a large number of imported accounts is probably somewhat unwieldy, thus it would be tempting to use generic passwords. Also, the new passwords must somehow be distributed to affected users, which presents an additional potential security problem. Therefore, it is recommended that bulk imported accounts be imported as inactive. Users can later create or change their passwords as their accounts are activated.**

Trees and Forests

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

- ❑ Significant planning must be done before creating the DNS namespace, trees, and forests because many aspects of these structures cannot be later modified.

- ❑ Maintain separate domains as needed to block administrative authority from one part of a system to another.

- ❑ Bulk imported accounts should be inactive; a secure method to create or change the account password as each account is activated should be locally devised.

Good Practices

- ❑ Avoid the use of multiple forests.

- ❑ Create shortcut trusts between frequently accessed domains with long trust paths.

- ❑ Use separate domains to implement distinct security settings.

Trees and Forests

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Chapter

6

Object Access Control

Like file permissions in NTFS, the security of Active Directory objects is based on access control lists (ACLs). This chapter discusses the basics behind Active Directory object ACLs and strategies for managing these ACLs.

The Active Directory security components are as follows:

- **Security Principals** - User, security group, service, and computer; Identified by a unique ID

- **Security Identifiers (SIDs)** - Uniquely identify security principals; Are never reused

- **Security Descriptors -** Security information associated with an object; Contains Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) and System Access Control Lists (SACLs)

Access control for Active Directory services works through security descriptors associated with every directory object or property. Each security descriptor contains a discretionary access control list (DACL) and a system access control list (SACL). The DACL is a set of access control entries (ACEs), each having a security identifier (SID) that represents the security principal (user, group, or computer) to whom the ACE applies, and permissions, which allow or deny users and groups rights to the objects. An ACE is used to determine which accesses a security principal is allowed to an object, or for a SACL, which accesses are audited. An example of a permission attached to an object is Read permission on a container attribute. The DACL determines who can see the object and what actions can be performed.

If auditing is configured for the object, its security descriptor also contains a system access control list (SACL) that controls how the security subsystem audits attempt to access the object.

Inheritance

Through inheritance, the ACEs in a parent object's security descriptor are passed to a child object's descriptor. ACE inheritance propagation from parent to child object happens when a child object is created or when a DACL or SACL on the parent object is modified. To prevent child objects from inheriting permissions, uncheck the **Allow inheritable permissions from parent to propagate to this object** check box. When permissions are blocked, the administrator is asked to choose whether to copy the previously inherited permissions to the object, or remove them.

Modifying Object Permissions

To view, add or change permissions or to block inheritance to child objects, perform the following steps:

❑ Click **Start ? Programs ? Administrative Tools ? Active Directory Users and Computers**

❑ On the **View** menu, click **Advanced Features**

❑ Right-click the object and select **Properties**

❑ In the **Properties** dialog box, click the **Security** tab

Figure 7 Object Security Properties

An example of an object's security properties is shown in **Figure 7**.

Active Directory permissions can be allowed or denied. When permission to perform an action is not explicitly assigned, it is implicitly denied. Permissions can also be explicitly denied. Object permissions can be set as standard or special. Special permissions provide a finer degree of control for assigning access to objects.

Active Directory Groups

In Active Directory there are two group types:

▪ **Security Groups** – used with access controls

▪ **Distribution Groups** – used with email (Exchange) applications

Security groups are listed in DACLs that define permissions on resources and objects. Distribution groups are not security-enabled. They cannot be listed in DACLs, but are used only with email applications, such as Exchange, to send email to a group of individuals. Distribution groups should never be used to create a general-purpose group and should be avoided.

The following Active Directory security group scopes are available:

- Universal

- Global

- Domain Local

Universal groups are available only in native mode. Universal groups are useful to consolidate groups that span multiple domains, but can cause replication overhead (see the Replication chapter in this guide). When processing a logon request for a user in a native-mode domain, a domain controller sends a query to a global catalog server to determine the user's universal group memberships. Since groups can be explicitly denied access to a resource, complete knowledge of a user's group memberships is necessary to enforce access control correctly. If a domain controller of a native-mode domain cannot contact a global catalog server when a user tries to log on, the domain controller refuses the logon request. In a single domain environment, global catalog servers are not required to process a user logon request.

Microsoft recommends the following group nesting strategy:

- Place domain users into Global Groups.

- Nest Global Groups as needed to increase flexibility in the event of organizational and network changes.

- Nest Global Groups into Universal Groups to consolidate groups that span multiple domains.

- Place Global and Universal Groups into Domain Local Groups at the location where they will be managed.

- Assign permissions to the Domain Local Groups.

A successful group nesting strategy aids security management by administering security policies consistently among groups and reduces errors that arise from managing and auditing Active Directory object access on a person-by-person basis. When setting Access Control Entries (ACEs) on Active Directory objects, it is much easier to allow and deny permissions to groups of users than to individuals. Security management by groups allows changes to security permissions to be updated more easily and accurately.

Object Ownership and Delegation of Control

Every object has an owner. The owner controls how permissions are set on an object, and to whom permissions are assigned. If a member of the Administrators group takes ownership, the default owner is the group, not the individual user. Whoever takes ownership is listed in the **Access Control Settings** dialog (from the object **Properties Security** tab **Advanced** button).

Object permissions for a user or group include permission to modify permissions and ownership. These permissions are viewed by performing the following actions:

- ❑ Right-click an object

- ❑ Click **Properties**

❑ Click the **Security** tab

❑ Click the **Advanced** button

❑ Select a permission entity

❑ Click the **View/Edit** button

Allowing **Modify Permissions** or **Modify Ownership** permissions gives the user or group authority to gain Full Control over the object (See **Figure 8).**

Warning: Modify Permissions and Modify Owner both allow a user to gain Full Control!

Figure 8 Modify Permissions on an Object

Delegating Object Control

A preferred way to delegate administrative control over Active Directory objects is to create OUs within a domain and use the Delegation of Control Wizard to assign granular permissions for administrators. To start the Delegation of Control Wizard, right-click an object in Active Directory Computers and Users, or select **Delegate Control** from the **Action** pull-down menu.

Default Access Control Security Settings

During the installation of Active Directory, security is enabled on the directory service and the file replication folders to control access to Active Directory objects. Default Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) are configured on Active Directory objects. The default security settings for Windows 2000 are held in the following templates:

- Workstations - `%systemroot%\inf\defltwk.inf`

- Member Servers - `%systemroot%\inf\defltsv.inf`

- Domain Controllers - `%systemroot%\inf\defltdc.inf`

These default templates can be viewed and edited through the Security Templates snap-in for the Microsoft Management Console (MMC). See the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy: Security Configuration Toolset* mini-guide for more information on using security templates.

Group Policy and Object Access Control

The templates contained in the Security Configuration Toolset can be used to create default GPOs for Active Directory Computer objects. GPOs can be linked to Active Directory Computer and User objects in domains, OUs and sites, as described in the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy* mini-guide. When a GPO for a Computer object is applied to a workstation or stand-alone computer (through a template or through the Group Policy MMC snap-in), users who log on to that computer can inherit the user rights for the GPOs that apply to them. Templates and GPOs are generally the best approach to implementing a given security policy for a group or category of users.

Schema Access Control

The Schema defines the classes and attributes of objects that can be created in the Active Directory database. The grouping of properties is defined by the property set attribute of a property in the schema.

When an object is created in the directory, a default ACL is applied. The default ACL is described in the schema definition of the object class.

Moving Active Directory Objects

Most Active Directory objects can be moved within a domain, including computer accounts, OUs, and user and group accounts.

When moving an Active Directory object, permissions assigned to the local object move with it. Inherited permissions do not move with the object, and the object will inherit permissions at the destination container.

Within a domain, the Active Directory Users and Computers administration tool can be used to move objects. Active Directory Users and Computers cannot move user accounts between domains, however. To move objects between domains, `Movetree` or one of the other support tools must be used to copy objects from a source domain to a destination domain and then delete the object at the source domain.

ACL Tools

Active Directory provides basic ACL tools to view and edit object ACLs. Other tools are available from the Microsoft Resource Kit.   A list of some of these tools follows.

Security Analysis and Configuration is a snap-in that analyzes and configures local machine system security. This snap-in can review security analysis results and provide recommendations together with current system settings. The snap-in can also resolve

any discrepancies revealed by analysis, and configure local computer settings. It can import security templates created with the Security Templates snap-in, and apply these to the GPO for the local computer to change the local computer security settings to the desired template. See the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy: Security Configuration Toolset* mini-guide for more information on this snap-in.

SECEDIT.EXE is the command-line version of the Security Analysis and Configuration snap-in. This program can be called from a batch program or automatic task scheduler to automatically create and apply templates and analyze system security. See the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy: Security Configuration Toolset* mini-guide for more information on this tool.

DSACLS.EXE is a command-line tool that can query and edit security attributes. It is the command-line equivalent to the Security page on various Active Directory snap-in tools.

ACLDIAG.EXE is a command-line tool that reads security attributes from an ACL. Output can be formatted as readable or tab-delimited. ACLDIAG can perform the following:

- Compare the ACL on a directory services object to the permissions defined in the schema defaults

- Check of fix standard delegations performed using templates from the Delegation of Control Wizard in Active Directory Users and Computers

- Grant effective permissions to a specific user or group or to all users and groups that are listed in the ACL

ACLDIAG cannot read GPO permissions because a GPO is a virtual object.

Access to Published Resources

Windows 2000 allows users access to published information and resources. This feature is designed to allow the publishing of information and resources not already in Active Directory. Publishing resources allows an administrator to publish non-Active Directory resources with the benefit of Active Directory security and access control. This section will briefly describe the publishing of printers and shared folders, in particular.

In Windows 2000, any printer shared by a print server that has an account in an Active Directory domain is published in Active Directory by default. To remove printer publishing, clear the **List in the Directory** check box on the printer's **Sharing** tab in Active Directory Computers and Users.

> **NOTE: It may help to click User, Groups, and Computers as containers on the View menu of Active Directory Computers and Users.**

Moving printers into a single OU improves security management allowing administration to be controlled by Group Policy. Also, discretionary access control lists (DACLs) on published resources can be used to limit access.

Shared folders can be published using Active Directory Users and Computers. Because a shared resource and a published Active Directory object that refer to the same shared resource are separate entities, each has its own DACL. The DACL for a shared printer, for example, controls who is allowed to print to the printer and who is allowed to manage print jobs. The DACL on the corresponding Active Directory printQueue object controls who can view or change the properties of the published object. Similarly, the DACL for a shared folder and the DACL for an Active Directory Shared Folder object control different attributes.

Controlling Access to MMC Consoles

Providing custom MMC consoles to administrators could be a means to limit the range of administrative utilities available to groups of administrators. A custom MMC console is created as follows:

- ❑ **Start ? Run ?** `mmc`
- ❑ Add desired snap-ins and extensions from the **Add/Remove Snap-ins** dialog
- ❑ Open the **Option** dialog and click the **Console** tab
- ❑ Select **User** (or **Author**) mode
- ❑ Configure the allowable view
- ❑ Save the MMC console

Author and User modes determine how easily the target administrator can change the console. Author mode freely allows any changes to the console. In User mode the console is not changeable by default. Regardless of whether the custom MMC console was saved in Author or User mode, a user can always modify the console by right-clicking the console, clicking Author, and then changing the console. The only way to prevent this is to not assign NTFS Write permission to the .msc file. Also, the only way to prevent a user from creating their own MMC console and including restricted utilities is to remove the utilities or deny file permissions on the target computer.

There are several ways to distribute a custom MMC console, including the following:

- ■ File (through email or on a removable media)
- ■ Group Policy
- ■ Shared Folder

Only the shared folder distribution method allows NTFS file permissions to prevent the recipient from changing the file after receiving it.

Chapter Security Summary

Object Access Control

Recommendations

❑ Use groups and group nesting to manage user permissions and to manage and audit access to Active Directory objects.

❑ Do not grant **Modify Permissions** or **Modify Ownership** permissions.

❑ Apply templates from the Security Configuration Toolset (See also the Security Configuration Toolset mini-guide).

❑ Establish a policy to use system security tools to monitor and manage access control and security settings.

❑ Move printers into a single OU (or central OUs) to simplify security management and to apply a GPO.

❑ Use DACLs on published resources to manage access.

❑ Do not assign NTFS Write permission to a custom MMC console .msc file if it is to remain unchanged.

❑ Distribute custom MMC consoles via shared folder with only **Read & Execute** NTFS permissions for users.

Good Practices

❑ Avoid the use of Distribution Groups.

❑ Track the delegation of permission assignments.

❑ Use Deny Permissions sparingly.

❑ Delegate to Groups and add specific users to those groups.

❑ When changing or reviewing a DACL for a published resource, remember to examine the corresponding DACL for the Active Directory object (and vice versa).

Chapter

7

Replication

In Active Directory, each domain controller keeps copies of a certain portion of the Active Directory database. The process of updating and synchronizing this information is replication. Active Directory uses multi-master replication with loose convergence. Multi-master replication allows a multi-domain controller network to function if a single domain controller becomes temporarily unavailable, with a few exceptions. Loose convergence means that the process of updating and synchronizing takes place at various intervals and schedules throughout a given network, not all at once at a predictable time.

Replication Events and Conflicts

Replication occurs when the following actions are performed on Active Directory information stored on a domain controller:

■ Add

■ Move

■ Modify

■ Delete

Delays or latencies between replication updates are based on change notifications received by a domain controller. Replication latencies between two domain controllers within a site occur based on the following schedules:

■ **5 minutes** – default replication latency with change notification

■ **One hour** – latency when no changes occur

■ **Urgent replication** – latency with immediate change notification

From time to time, replication updates on separate master replicas is inconsistent due to factors such as multiple updates occurring within a latency period. This inconsistency may lead to a replication conflict. These conflicts are resolved using timestamps containing the version number, time, and server ID.

Replication conflicts may affect the addition or update of object attributes that impact on security. For example, changes to group membership, ACLs and ACEs, or Group Policy attributes may occasionally behave unpredictably.

As mentioned in the Group Policy section above, there may be replication and synchronization issues regarding GPO updates. For example, if two or more

administrators edit the same GPO from different domain controllers, the last update will overwrite any previous updates. If an administrator makes more than one change to a GPO, the replication of a previous change could overwrite a later change. It is recommended that administrators ensure that previous GPO updates are fully replicated before proceeding to make additional updates.

Over time, Active Directory information automatically propagates from one domain controller to another, based on latency times. Active Directory provides a "Replicate Now" function to manually initiate the replication process. The "Replicate Now" function for each server in Active Directory Sites and Services is limited to the server pair selected from the details pane. To manually initiate replication throughout a given domain from any domain controller in the domain, do the following:

- ❑ **Start ? Programs ? Administrative Tools ? Active Directory Sites and Services**
- ❑ Expand or double-click the **Sites** folder
- ❑ Expand or double-click the **Site Name** icon (**Default-First-Site-Name** unless it has been renamed)
- ❑ Expand or double-click the **Servers** folder
- ❑ Expand or double-click the domain-root server icon (i.e., the name of the root server)
- ❑ Select (left-click) the **NTDS Settings** for the domain-root server icon
- ❑ In the details pane, all of the other servers should be shown
- ❑ Right-click a site link connection in the details pane and select **Replicate Now** from the top of the pop-up menu
- ❑ Repeat the above step for all remaining site link connections

Inter-site links can similarly be replicated from the Inter-Site Transports folder of the Active Directory Sites and Services interface.

Universal Groups can be used to consolidate groups that span multiple domains. However, membership changes to a Universal Group are updated in the Global Catalog and replicated to all global catalog servers in the forest. Further, any Universal Group changes cause the entire membership list to be replicated. Global and domain local groups are listed in the Global Catalog, but their membership is not. Thus, changes to a global or domain local group will not cause Global Catalog replication to occur.

Site Replication

Active Directory uses sites to segment or partition normal replication within high-speed connections and reduce replication traffic across slow-speed connections, namely WAN links. Sites are physically defined by IP subnets and the specific parameters for replication between them. Sites are also used to control logon traffic.

Within sites, replication occurs between domain controllers based on change notifications and the latency values for normal replication. The network is assumed to be fast and highly reliable and replication traffic is uncompressed.

Between sites, replication occurs on a manually defined schedule to accommodate bandwidth and usage needs and schedules. Replication traffic between sites is compressed. Active Directory automatically designates one or more servers in each site to be a bridgehead server using a function called the Intersite Topology Generator. These settings can be viewed and edited as follows:

❑ From **Active Directory Sites and Services**, expand and select a site in the **Sites** folder

❑ In the details pane, right-click the **NTDS Site Settings** object and click **Properties**

The Active Directory Sites and Services tool can be used to schedule site links for times when network traffic is relatively low.

Site Replication Protocols

Replication within sites must use the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocol over IP. Replication between sites can be either RPC or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).

For systems that cross firewall boundaries, the choice of RPC or SMTP may be significant. The RPC protocol has associated with it numerous security concerns and is often blocked at filtering routers. A system security policy that prohibits RPC across routers would necessitate the use of SMTP for replication between sites.

Placement of Servers Within Sites

Sites have some special requirements that affect server placement. The following are some general recommendations:

❑ Each site should have at least one **domain controller**

❑ **Global Catalog Servers** must be available for user log on in a native-mode domain, or when a user logs on with a user principal name

❑ **DNS servers** are needed so that clients can find domain controllers and domain controllers can find other domain controllers

If there is no domain controller within a given site, then DNS, not Active Directory, determines where to search for a network resource. In a large system, this type of search may be relatively inefficient, depending on the DNS configurations of the clients and servers.

Replication Monitor

Active Directory provides a Replication Monitor tool (`replmon.exe`) to graphically display the replication topology of connections between servers in the same site. Replication Monitor can perform the following:

■ Display the replicating partner

■ Display each USN value, the number of failed attempts, reason, and flags

- Poll the server at an administrator-defined interval

- Monitor the count of failed replication attempts

- Show which objects have not yet been replicated

- Synchronize between just two domain controllers

- Trigger the KCC into recalculating the replication topology

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

❑ Manually initiate NTDS replication to increase the certainty that security settings begin replication in a timely manner.

❑ If lack of network bandwidth is a security concern, minimize membership in and use of Universal Groups to reduce replication overhead. if lack of network bandwidth is a security concern.

❑ Use SMTP for replication between sites where replication crosses a firewall boundary.

Good Practices

❑ Periodically review security configurations and settings for accuracy, especially following multiple and/or significant changes to Active Directory; replication latency could be minute, hours, or days depending on system conditions.

❑ Use the Replication Monitor tool to monitor the replication structure and periodically recalculate replication topology.

Chapter

8

Operations Masters

Active Directory is designed to perform multi-master operation and replication, with conflict resolution. Some operations make use of single master or operations master roles primarily for backward-compatibility and for applications that are intolerant of collisions. This chapter discusses the security concerns and recommendations for operations masters.

Operations Master Roles

The five operations master roles are:

- **Schema master**

  - the only domain controller that can write to the directory schema

- **Domain naming master**

  - the only domain controller that can add or remove domains

- **PDC Emulator**

  - acts as the PDC for any existing BDCs

  - manages password changes from computers running Windows 95/98/NT

  - minimizes replication latency for password changes

  - synchronizes the time on all domain controllers throughout the domain to its time

  - prevents the possibility of overwriting GPOs

- **RID master**

  - allocates blocks of relative identifiers to each domain controller in its domain

  - prevents object duplication if objects move from one domain controller to another

- **Infrastructure master**

  - updates references to objects and group memberships from other domains

  - not needed in a single domain forest

There is only one schema master and domain naming master per forest. The other operations masters are per-domain; i.e., there is only one PDC Emulator, RID master and Infrastructure master per domain.

Operations Masters Placement

Because the domain-naming master verifies the name of a new object by querying the global catalog server, the global catalog must run on the same domain controller as the one holding the domain naming master role. The global catalog runs on the forest root domain controller, by default.

The infrastructure operations master should not be the same domain controller that hosts the global catalog. If the infrastructure master and the global catalog are the same computer, the infrastructure master will not function because it does not contain any references to objects that it does not hold.

It is good practice to place the schema and domain-naming masters at the global catalog domain controller. The other three roles should be distributed to separate servers, to the extent possible, to increase fault tolerance. There should be at least one replica in the forest root domain, for fault tolerance.

Operations master roles can be transferred from one domain controller to another, when operationally necessary. If an operations master role server becomes disabled for an extended period, its role must be seized. These transfer and seize operations can be performed from any available domain controller within the affected domain, or to which a connection is made.

Global Catalog Server

The Global Catalog holds a copy (replica) of every object in Active Directory, but with a limited number of each object's attributes. The Global Catalog stores those attributes most frequently used in search operations, and attributes required to locate a full replica of the object.

The first domain controller in a forest is automatically designated as the global catalog server. An administrator can view and manage the global catalog server designation through the Active Directory Sites and Services tool as follows:

❑ In **Active Directory Sites and Services**, expand the console tree and navigate to the domain controller NTDS settings

❑ Right-click the domain controller NTDS settings

❑ Click **Properties**

The **Global Catalog** check box on the **General** tab can be used to make a domain controller a global catalog server or to demote a global catalog server. It is recommended that there be one global catalog server per site. More than one global catalog server per site is generally not needed. A global catalog server should not be demoted unless another domain controller is hosting the global catalog server role.

Operations Masters

Global catalog servers must be available to support authentication requests, locate system resources, and enable Active Directory functionality such as universal groups. For example, without access to a global catalog server, the Local Security Authority (LSA) on the user's computer cannot include the user's universal groups in his or her security token. Since such groups might be used to deny access to certain resources, Active Directory will refuse a logon request in a native-mode domain if a global catalog server is unavailable.

The domain controller servicing an authentication request must be able to communicate with a global catalog server. The Global Catalog query is sent to port 3268 on the domain controller. Standard Active Directory queries, which are directed to the domain-local partition, are sent to port 389, which is the standard LDAP port. Because these ports are well known and are critical to the functioning of Active Directory, they are susceptible to various forms of denial of service attacks, such as IP packet flooding. It is not realistic that these ports can be shielded from a denial of service attack from inside a given system. Measures should be taken to protect and hide the identity of domain controllers serving requests to these (and other) ports from outside the enterprise security perimeter.

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

❑ Permanently remove from the network a disabled domain controller that held a schema master, domain-naming master, or RID master whose role has been seized.

❑ Take measures to hide the identity of domain controllers from external networks.

Good Practices

❑ Transfer operations master roles before demoting a domain controller.

❑ Consider the network traffic for GPO refresh, password changes, and time synchronization when assigning the PDC Emulator to a domain controller.

❑ Assign the schema and domain naming master roles to the domain controller that runs the global catalog.

❑ Place a global catalog server in the same site as the infrastructure master.

❑ Consider network traffic and accessibility when determining the location of the global catalog server.

Auditing

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Chapter

9

Auditing

An audit strategy is provided with the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy: Security Configuration Toolset* mini-guide. It is recommended that administrators begin with the Toolset template as a baseline audit policy. This section of the Active Directory mini-guide provides a simple overview of Active Directory audit capabilities.

Enabling Auditing on AD Objects

Enabling audit settings adds Access Control Entries (ACEs) to the System Access Control List (SACL) of the security descriptor of the Active Directory object to be audited.

To configure an audit policy for a domain controller, do the following:

❑ **Start ?   Run ?**   mmc

❑ From the **Console** pull-down menu select **Add/Remove Snap-in**

❑ Click the **Add** button

❑ Double-click the **Group Policy** snap-in

❑ From the **Select Group Policy Object** dialog, click the **Browse** button

❑ Click the **All** tab to view all GPOs for the domain

❑ Select the domain controllers policy and click **OK**

❑ Click the **Finish** button

❑ Click the **Close** button

❑ From the **Add/Remove Snap-in** dialog, click the **OK** button to add the domain controllers Group Policy snap-in

❑ From the domain controllers group policy console tree, expand and navigate to **Computer   Configuration? Windows   Settings? Security   Settings? Local Policies? Audit Policy**

❑ Double-click each policy in the details pane to view or edit the policy

The procedure to enable audit settings for other GPOs is the same, except that a different GPO is selected as the object of the MMC snap-in. The way to enable audit for an OU, for example, is to link a GPO to the OU and configure audit settings for the GPO.

Audit can be enabled for individual computer, user, and group Active Directory objects. To set an auditing SACL on an individual object, do the following:

❑ **Start ? Programs ? Administrative Tools ? Active Directory Users and Computers**

❑ On the **View** menu, select **Advanced Features**

❑ Expand the console tree and navigate to the container holding the target object

❑ Right-click the target object from the details pane and select **Properties**

❑ Click the **Security** tab

❑ Click the **Advanced** button

❑ Select the **Auditing** tab

❑ Click the **Add** button to see the **Select User, Computer, or Group** dialog

❑ Select a security principal name and click **OK**

❑ The **Auditing Entry for <object>** dialog appears with two tabs: **Object** and **Properties**

> **NOTE: The Object tab contains generic and control rights to audit. The Property tab contains property accesses to audit. The "Apply onto:" pull-down menu provides the choice "This object and all child objects" by default, or various other object scopes. The "Apply these auditing entries to objects and/or containers within this container only" checkbox applies audit within the current container if checked, or throughout the domain if unchecked**

❑ Select **Object** and/or **Property** accesses and click **OK**

❑ At the **Access Control Settings** window, determine whether auditing entries must be inherited from the parent container to propagate this object. If so, check the **Allow inheritable auditing entries from parent to propagate to this object** checkbox.

❑ At the **Properties** window, determine whether auditing permissions must be inherited from the parent container to this object. If so, check the **Allow inheritable auditing entries from parent to propagate to this object** checkbox.

Audit settings are set as "Local Policies." Local policies are local to a computer, with no distinction among the types of computers, such as domain controllers, servers, or workstations.

Reviewing Audit events

Audit events are recorded in the computer's Security Log in the Event Viewer. To view the audit log, do the following:

❑ **Start ? Programs ? Administrative Tools ? Event Viewer**

❑ Select **Security Log** from the **Event Viewer** console tree

To view and edit the file system properties of the audit log, right-click on the **Security Log** to open the **Security Log Properties** dialog. From this dialog, the log size and overwrite options can be configured from the **General** tab. Filtering options are available from the

Filter tab. It is recommended that the settings from the Security Configuration Toolset template and mini-guide be used as a baseline policy for the security log properties.

The logging of audit events can generate voluminous output. An audit policy should be implemented to manage review and analysis, and file system issues. Audit settings should be tested to see if:

- They capture the expected events

- Audit log data can be analyzed and understood

- The amount of audit log data is manageable

For events where data is returned to the event properties data text area, the returned data code can be translated using the `net helpmsg` command line utility. To use the `net helpmsg` utility, from the **Data** text area, translate the hexadecimal code to decimal by clicking the **Words** radio button. Then run `net helpmsg <message decimal number>` to get a description.

In addition to the Event Viewer, numerous log files exist in various places in the Windows 2000 file system. The debug log files located in the `%Systemroot%\Debug` folder often contain events that may be related to security. The debug log files are as follows:

- **DCPromoUI.log** – detailed progress report of the Active directory installation and removal processes

- **DCPromos.log** – created by the user interface during the graphical user interface mode setup when a Windows NT 4.0 domain controller is promoted to a Windows 2000 domain controller

- **DCPromo.log** – created by using the Active Directory Installation Wizard

- **Netsetup.log** – provides information about the attempts to join domains and records any errors that might result

- **Netlogon.log** – created whenever the Net Logon service is used

- **Ntfrsapi.log** – contains events that take place during the installation or removal of Active Directory regarding the File Replication Service

- **Userenv.log** – can be useful in troubleshooting problems with user profiles and Group Policy processing

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

- ❑ Refer to the Security Configuration Toolset template and mini-guide as a baseline general audit policy

- ❑ Identify and audit specific user, computer, group and other objects that have security significance

- ❑ Formulate a test plan to test major changes to audit settings

Good Practices

❑ Monitor other security-related Windows 2000 logs, such as the debug logs

Auditing

Chapter

10

Backup/Restore and Database Maintenance

Active Directory backup and restore are essential components of a contingency planning and disaster recovery security policy. As far as the Active Directory database is concerned, the system state data is the most important data to be backed up. See the Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 File Resources mini-guide for more information on system backups.

Backup

To back up the system state data, do the following:

- ❑ **Start ? Programs? Accessories? System Tools? Backup**
- ❑ Click the **Backup Wizard** button
- ❑ From the Backup Wizard dialog, click **Next**
- ❑ Click the **Only back up the System State data** radio button
- ❑ Click the **Browse** button to select the backup media destination
- ❑ Click **Next**
- ❑ Review the settings and click **Finish**

Because Backup supports only local backups of Active Directory, each domain controller must be backed up to entirely back up Active Directory. For full disaster recovery, select "Back up everything on my computer" from the "What to Back Up" menu.

Restore

Active Directory restore can be non-authoritative or authoritative. A non-authoritative restore reinstates the Active Directory data to its state before the last backup. Distributed services are restored from the backup and the restored data is then updated through replication. Because the restore is non-authoritative, all changes since the last backup will overwrite restored data upon replication. To perform a non-authoritative restore:

- ❑ Restart the domain controller, and press the F8 key to display the advanced startup options
- ❑ Select **Directory Services Restore Mode** to start Windows 2000 (this option does not start Active Directory and does not enable network connections)

❑ Logon using the local Administrator account

❑ Use **Backup** to restore the latest system data

❑ Restart the domain controller

An authoritative restore allows the administrator to mark data as current, thus preventing replication from overwriting that information. An authoritative restore occurs after a non-authoritative restore, typically to restore Active Directory to a previously known safe state; for example, before Active Directory objects were accidentally deleted. To perform an authoritative restore:

❑ Restart the domain controller, and press the F8 key to display the advanced startup options

❑ Select **Directory Services Restore Mode** to start Windows 2000 (this option does not start Active Directory and does not enable network connections)

❑ Logon using the local Administrator account

❑ Use **Backup** to restore Active Directory to its original location. Also, restore Active Directory to an alternate location when you need to perform an authoritative restore on the SYSVOL.

❑ At a command prompt, type `ntdsutil`

❑ At the `ntdsutil` prompt, type `authoritative restore`

❑ At the `authoritative restore` prompt, type `restore subreee <distinguished name of object>`

❑ Type `quit` and press enter twice to exit **ntdsutil**

❑ Restart the domain controller

To perform an authoritative restore, the administrator must know the distinguished names of objects to be restored. Therefore, it is recommended that system administrators keep an updated object map from which to restore Active Directory objects.

When objects are deleted, they are marked as "tombstone" objects. Garbage collection runs on every domain controller after every 12 hours of operation. The default tombstone lifetime (set in the registry) is 60 days. The backup of the system state data cannot be older than the tombstone lifetime. A domain controller keeps track of deleted objects for only this period. Tombstones cannot be restored.

Backup erases the system state data upon restore and replaces it with the system state data being restored. Depending on how old the system state data is, recent configuration changes could be lost. System state data should be backed up frequently to reduce risk of losing state data.

Schema changes are permanent. A Schema Admin cannot mark the schema directory partition as authoritative; therefore, schema changes cannot be undone using an authoritative restore. It is recommended that a backup be performed before making schema changes.

Chapter Security Summary

Recommendations

- [ ] Ensure a robust password policy, as described in the *Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows 2000 Group Policy: Security Configuration Toolset* mini-guide, is enforced for local Administrator passwords used to protect the `ntds.dit` Active Directory database file while in restore mode

- [ ] Maintain an up-to-date Active Directory object map from which to perform authoritative restore, in case something important is accidentally deleted

- [ ] The tombstone lifetime interval should not be greatly reduced

- [ ] Separate the database and backup files

- [ ] Back up the system state data of domain controllers frequently

- [ ] Do a backup before making changes to the schema

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Appendix

A

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Appendix D – Refrences